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Dear Mr. Rogers:

During the past month in Kenya there has been more terrorist activity. The chronology of Mau Mau acts of violence continues to indicate a higher degree of tactical coordination, the obtainment and use of better weapons, and the development of better terrorist leadership. Home-made guns manufactured from iron piping with rubber band firing mechanisms have been found in increasing quantities, a sizable cache being reported on 9th April in the Nanyuki area. On the same date in South Nyeri a security patrol was fired upon by terrorists armed with automatic weapons, probably Sten light machine guns. On the 12th, while chasing a terrorist group which had stolen a herd of cattle, a military patrol was ambushed, its point fired upon, and one tracker was killed and another left behind in the resulting withdrawal. In Nairobi on April 13th a Dodge automobile was used in an unsuccessful assault against a native policeman. One of the car gangsters was captured and found to be armed with an automatic pistol. A night "attack" against the Kenya Regiment base camp at Nyeri was reported repulsed. In the Nairobi area two African special policemen manning a road block were shot dead. On April 13th four Kenya Regiment men, all Europeans, were killed by an ambush laid round a hut which they were trying to enter. A few days later in the Kariogangi area a headman and three guards disappeared. On the 21st another European, employee of the City of Nairobi, was shot fatally in the back by an unknown African. Another attempt the same day resulted in the death of a would-be killer; the intended victim, also a European government employee, was able to shoot back when the African's pistol jammed. In the Aberdares two European Kenya Police Reservists fought their way out of an ambush while African members of the patrol were racing back for reinforcements. Another Mau Mau hideout was reported discovered on 23rd April and its stores included a freshly slaughtered ox and quantities of maize, beans and biltong. On April 22nd inside the South Nyeri reserve a tribal policeman was killed, one rifle was lost, five guards were wounded during a one-half hour fight between Kikuyu Home Guard and a Mau Mau gang. Squatters in the same area were found to have furnished food and drink for a Mau Mau gang and to have participated in a large oath-taking ceremony presided over by Dedan Kimathi, a well known Mau Mau leader of the area. The extent to which Mau Mau actions have become routinized is illustrated by the sight which surprised a Kenya Regiment patrol which was sneaking through the jungle late in the month. They found a Mau Mau hideout with bits of loot lying around guarded by a lone member who was lounging in underpants, smoking a cigarette, and reading a copy of Baraza under a colored golf umbrella.

The horrible side of the violence expressed itself tragically late in the month at Chehe Sawmills ten miles up the slopes of Mt. Kenya from Karatina. A

gang, believed led by an Embu tribesman who served in Burma with the King's African Rifles, killed and hacked to pieces an Italian woman and her son and daughter, aged ten and fifteen. It was a daytime raid executed in view and hearing of the husband and some 200 Kikuyu laborers. Wearing grass masks the terrorists rushed at the house, fired into it to kill the mother, then entered and killed the girl and dragged the boy from a hiding place in a closet and shot him to death. The husband rushed towards the house from the sawmill some 200 yards away but was pinned down by gunfire and took shelter in a ditch. The laborers panicked into the sawmill buildings. One Mkamba tribesman did leave and ran ten miles to the nearest police post. The bodies were hacked to pieces, and "certain members" were reported torn away, probably for Mau Mau ritual purposes.

There have been further indications of a possible spread of Mau Mau. During the middle of the month a settler was murdered near Kitale, many miles west of the Mau Mau area and near the site of the Kenyatta trial. Official doubt has been expressed that the murder was by Mau Mau or by the Dini ya Msambwa secret society, but the killing was similar. In the Kisumu area, also far outside the known Mau Mau danger zone, but scene of one panga attack on Europeans and home of two arrested suspected Mau Mau leaders, six Africans have been found guilty of inspiring disaffection and expressing anti-government views at a meeting of Africans near Kisumu.

On the other side, a new organization to control the emergency - welcomed as similar to the system which had proved successful in Malaya - was announced by the Government on April 10. In the new setup, which was largely the result of pressure from the European Elected Members of Legco, the unofficial European community is represented at all levels in the organizations responsible for formulating and implementing policy. There is a fairly clear chain of command from an overall commander at the center down through Provincial and District levels. At the top (to replace a small official Emergency Council) there is now a Colony Emergency Committee of seven members - the Governor, who presides, the Chief Secretary, the Members for Finance and Development and for Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of Operations, the General Officer Commanding, East African Command, and one Unofficial. The Governor, advised by this Committee, decides overall emergency policy. At the same time Major-General W. Hinde was given responsibility for issuing directives to implement the Governor's policy and the new title, Director of Operations. It is now clearly stated that he has authority over all administrative officers and is solely responsible for operational control of all the forces of law and order, including troops made available by the G.O.C., East African Command, units of the Royal Air Force allocated to him, the Police, the Kenya Police Reserve, and the Kenya Regiment. (Actually, he had these powers before and their reiteration and emphasis now is in response to popular European clamor for an overall command.) The Director of Operations is also to suggest policy or policy changes to the Colony Emergency Committee and bring to the notice of the Committee matters referred to it by Provincial Committees. To assist and advise him, there is a Director of Operations' Committee, including one unofficial member, which is responsible for issuing instructions implementing decisions of the Colony Emergency Committee and the Governor. The Director's Committee also proposes policy changes to the Colony Committee and handles day to day matters referred upward to the Colony Emergency Committee from the Provincial Committees.

At the lower level Provincial and District Emergency Committees were set up too. The Provincial Emergency Committees (the existing Provincial Security Committees renamed and reformed) each consist of the Provincial Commissioner, the Senior Military and Police Officers and one unofficial member. These committees are to advise the Provincial Commissioner on means of locally applying the overall policy of the Colony Emergency Committee and on means of carrying out the operational orders of the Director of Operations. If a Provincial Committee wished to obtain a policy decision from the Colony Committee it would refer the matter to the Director of Operations. Provincial Emergency Councils were to be created of members drawn from all races to advise the Provincial Emergency Committees. The District Emergency Committees (the existing District Security Committees reformed with an unofficial member added) include the District Commissioner, the senior Military and Police Officers in the District and one unofficial European. They are to advise the District Commissioners in formulating more local policy within the Provincial policy.

At the Colony, Provincial and District levels in the affected area joint operations committees were to be set up to direct all operations by the forces of law and order in accordance with the policy prescribed by their respective Emergency Committees. There were to be Provincial and District Executive Officers to issue directions to carry out the policy decisions of the Committees, convene meetings of the Emergency Committees, man Joint Operations Rooms with Army and Police officers, and preside over District Joint Operations Committees. Where necessary, the District Executive Officer was to be chosen from the best men available - whether official or unofficial. An Inspector General of the Kenya Police Reserve, with the principal task of integrating that body with the regular Police, was appointed.

After the description, which I have abbreviated from the text of Emergency Directive No. 2 as published in the East African Standard of April 24, I leave it to you to surmise whether the system evolved is streamlined or cumbersome and whether it comprises an efficient control setup or a vast and unjustified supervisory structure above the relatively few soldiers and police who wield the rifles and Sten guns. The simple soldier's procedure of "break the ground into pieces, put a good man in charge of each piece, divide the men and guns among the pieces according to enemy strength, and then make the central headquarters serve the troops" has not been mentioned. If it occurred to anyone, it has been found inapplicable, for reasons which this observer would believe to lie outside military and police considerations. The new system, on paper, can be said to give everyone in the Colony, except the Mau Mau members, a say in the conduct of operations against terrorists, but I cannot see how the actual operators can be responsive to so many voices, or how a command by a single voice can have any degree of positiveness after it has been filtered through so many separate influences.

At the same time that the new organization was made known, it was announced that, with the agreement of the Secretary of State, an examination was being made to see if the processes of justice could be accelerated in cases of capital offences committed by terrorists. The Governor was reported to have told the United Kenya Protection Association that he accepted summary justice in principle and had made detailed recommendations on this to the Secretary of State.

It was also announced that during the present acute period of the Emergency there would be no discussion of the constitutional future of the country and no increase in the number of portfolios held by non-officials. Once this phase was

past and the Government considered the situation appropriate, conversations on this subject would be held within a few months. This announcement probably was intended to counter widespread allegations that the European settlers intended to exploit the Emergency to obtain permanent legal control of the Colony.

The Governor and later the Director of Operations made it clear they were opposed to calling the emergency an armed rebellion. The Director in his directive of April 15 declared that the campaign against Mau Mau and the restoration of law and order would continue to be a Police Operation with the military in support. Both officials expressed the view that the establishment of strong Home Guard units in the Kikuyu reserves, strengthened by Europeans and better armed, was a priority means of ending the emergency. Subsequently a number of steps were announced to strengthen the Home Guard in the Central and Rift Valley Provinces. In the Rift Valley loyal men from the reserves were to be appointed chiefs in the settled areas to strengthen the resistance movement. In the Central Province the Director of Operations (in his Directive No. 3) announced that the Home Guards had been renamed the Kikuyu Guard and the Embu Guard (to avoid confusion with the Home Guards in Nairobi and Nakuru) and that they were to be built up to strength of at least 50 in each group, with at least 6 groups to each location. A director would be appointed to supervise them and two Europeans per division were being sought to assist. Their operations would be directed by the District Joint Operations Committees. A few days earlier it had been announced that 200 rifles - to be supplemented later with shotguns to be delivered from the UK - had been issued to reliable members of approved units and that Home Guard strongpoints to serve as bases against terrorist gangs were being built. Funds for rewards to the guards were to be substantially increased.

Police and military activities have been intensified, and intensification has of course provided the few incidents required to incite charges abroad of indiscriminate slaughter of helpless and innocent people. Police strength had grown by the middle of the month from 6,300 to 8,400, and it was reinforced by some 750 farm guards, some 700 special police and some thousands of Kikuyu Home Guards. Security forces, including Police Reserve and other elements, had killed some 300 Mau Mau during the two months ending April 15th. About 200 deaths were inflicted by Mau Mau in the same period, including 135 known dead in the Lari, Uplands, Massacre. More than 100 of the terrorists were accounted for by the 23rd Battalion of the K.A.R. during the three weeks ending April 18th, the tally being made up solely of bodies brought in and identified. On the 24th of April it was reported that a gang was trapped in the Fort Hall District and eleven members killed. On the 25th six were killed and five having bullet wounds were captured out of a gang in the Uplands area, and yet another gang of five were completely wiped out.

Anybody so inclined can presume from these reports that a lot of trigger-happiness exists among the security forces. One reads here and there of a prisoner agreeing to guide his captors to a terrorist hideout, attempting to escape and being shot dead during the subsequent walk through the bush. This of course could be a device for the private no-eye-witnesses killing of captured men. However, a lot of wounded prisoners are being brought back, some of them non-walking; and an eyewitness to several infantry mop-up operations in the last war would be surprised that these wounded are not killed on the ground, while the heat of battle made the shooting legal. The soldiers and policemen here are human, but they are exercising more restraint and more observance of legal restrictions than any experienced onlooker could reasonably expect.

A little over a week ago the Special Branch of the Police - in the most important piece of police work since the "Jock Scott Operation" at the start of the emergency - rounded up and arrested in Nairobi fifteen alleged members of the Central Council of Mau Mau which the police say had been directing the organization, at least around Nairobi and in some districts of the Central Province, for the past few months. At the same time documents were seized which contained much valuable information on the district units of the Mau Mau movement - as well as statements identifying Kenyatta as the leader. Some of the documents listed rules of the district committees, including their composition, the offences and punishments to be imposed by the local Mau Mau courts and directives issued by the Central Council. One of these directives was said to contain the statement "Our great leader and loved one Jomo Kenyatta who has been imprisoned by the Whites ... Those leaders of ours who are locked up ... have despatched a message to us ... that we should make every effort for it is better to die than to live as slaves and this is the time. But there are many enemies and these must be outrooted before big war begins. Let us take an oath that those who conducted the case of Jomo and those who put handcuffs on him shall be destroyed ... We must take an oath that those who hinder us and who help the Whites must die as they sleep together with their wives and their children and their property must be destroyed ..." The directive went on to order that messengers be sent from each "house" to the Central Council on March 25 - the day before the Lari Massacre. From this it appears that the movement may have been better organized than had been supposed. The police coup - one of the outstanding Government successes to date - probably dealt Mau Mau a serious blow.

About the same time the Police were raiding illegal shanty villages - Mathari, Maparani, Kariobangi - in the Mathari and Getathuru valleys near Nairobi which were believed to be hotbeds of Mau Mau activity and the stronghold of the movement in Nairobi. All Kikuyu inhabitants were screened by loyal teams from the reserves and removed from the area, huts were searched and then demolished by bulldozers. In shallow graves in the area Police found at least 19 bodies (all African but one, believed to be a Sikh) of Mau Mau victims believed to have been executed by hanging or strangling on the orders of a Mau Mau "court" within the previous three weeks. Of 5,000 screened, seven were wanted for murder, 500 were considered worth detaining pending inquiries in the reserves and 800 were to be charged with breaking pass laws.

Other police and military gains continued, but there was criticism of the Police for not releasing details regarding the Naivasha police station raid in which so many arms with ammunition were captured by a gang. Security forces were also criticized for incaution shortly after the four European members of Kenya Regiment were killed. A letter published in the East African Standard mentioned that tracker dogs - invaluable for jungle patrol work - had been available but had not been requisitioned and used. On the 22nd of April Sir Alexander Cameron, the General Officer Commanding, East Africa Command, broadcast to forces admonishing the askaris, or native soldiers, to "shoot straight and hit with the first round" and cautioning them that they - with their superior eyesight and hearing - should "make it a point of honour that no enemy remains concealed when you are near." He cited the necessary qualities for the type of jungle warfare with which his deployed troops are faced as "alertness, silence, speed and good shooting."

The Government has also announced a new policy on the movement of Kikuyu from the settled farming areas to the reserves. By the 20th of the month almost 30,000

Kikuyu, whose removal was considered essential in the interests of security, had passed through the transit camps and had been repatriated to the reserves, and over 11,000 more were in the camps awaiting repatriation. Probably another 30,000 had returned to the reserves voluntarily - mainly because of Mau Mau inspired rumors that they would lose their right to land there if they did not return. This exodus, of course, has increased the impoverished, discontented numbers in the reserves, strained public finance and transport, and affected the economy of the European farming areas, and it has been widely criticized in the Colony. The Government has now decided to empty the transit camps and to try to check further movements out of the settled areas. Also, since it is expected that many of those returned to the reserves will soon wish to seek reemployment outside, plans are being made for controlling the movement of Kikuyu out of the reserves and their employment in dam-making, tsetse clearing and other rehabilitation schemes. With the change in policy, responsibility for its implementation has also been shifted. Responsibility for managing the transit camps has been transferred from the Labour Department to the Administration. General responsibility for the movement of Kikuyu from settled areas back to the reserves has been transferred from the Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources to the Member for African Affairs. The latter and the Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources will have responsibility for handling the movement of Kikuyu out of the reserves to new employment.

As I mentioned in my last newsletter, Jomo Kenyatta and the other defendants at the Karenguria trials have been found guilty and have been sentenced to ten years of imprisonment which in practice would be seven years at hard labor. Appeals have been lodged against all the sentences at the Supreme Court in Nairobi, while Justice Thacker is resting, with two detectives assigned to protect him from possible Mau Mau vengeance even in England. From my observations at the trial and later study of published evidence, I had gathered that, regardless of the accused's guilt, the evidence written on paper would not support a conviction and maximum sentence - unless points were stretched to allow for the natural paucity of proof where a secret society was involved. The Defence Counsel in the course of the trial had seemed skillful in blocking the recording of evidence and in efforts to provoke the bench and prosecutor into making irrational pronouncements. The broad pattern of the evidence was a body of assertions by Crown witnesses and a larger body of counter-assertions by defence witnesses - one group of people arising to call an earlier group liars. The defence witnesses on the most critical points outnumbered the Crown witnesses. In his statement, citing his previous experience in observing the "demeanour" of African witnesses, Justice Thacker wrote that he had no hesitancy in taking the word of one witness whom he felt to be telling the truth against ten witnesses whom he believed to be lying. I imagine that the basis for Thacker's finding could best be assessed by digging into precedents from secret society trials in India. I was surprised at the uncompromised findings and maximum sentences. The disclosures above of further indications of Kenyatta's guilt after the trial bear out a widespread opinion that he is guilty; but an equally widespread notion is that his guilt could never be proved to the satisfaction of Western rules of evidence.

Other trials have continued in the news. Two men have been sentenced to death for the murder of Senior Chief Waruhiu, one of the accused, John Mbiu Koinange, son of Ex-Senior Chief Koinange, being acquitted but detained. All six Africans accused of conspiring to kill Waruhiu, including Ex-Senior Chief Koinange Mbiyu, were acquitted. Seven men have been sentenced to death in connection with the murder

of the Ruck family, and three others convicted, possibly under 18 at the time of the murder, have been detained during the Governor's pleasure.

Legal processes are being streamlined in an attempt to secure rapid convictions and punishments for the perpetrators of the Lari Massacre. The Lari Massacre trials illustrate an attempt to make British legal processes work in a society which traditionally respects rapid vengeance and blood payment against criminals. On March 26th the massacre occurred. On the 28th a Criminal Investigation Department team moved into the area, and on April 4th the first batch of accused were committed for trial at the Supreme Court. Nine days later, on April 13th, the first trial of 26 facing murder charges started at Githunguri - on the grounds of Kenyatta's banned Kenya Teachers Training College. The second trial, in which 73 other Kikuyu face murder charges, opened on April 28 in another courthouse specially built on the same grounds, but it stopped without legally beginning when the judge ruled he had no jurisdiction to enter the trial because the Registrar of the Supreme Court had decided on the date and place of the trial without written notice from the "competent authority," the Deputy Public Prosecutor. To date some 260 have been accused and further trials will be held.

From the viewpoint of loyal chiefs this is not fast enough but it is instantaneous compared with the usual treatment of African criminals under British law. For the settlers generally the Lari operation was a stepping up and streamlining essential to derive any good effects from the punishment and sentences; to jurists outside it could provide evidence of rubber stamp justice.

The new setup has failed to squelch unofficial European criticism of the handling of the emergency. The new system gave the Europeans the top overall command and the unified command at Provincial and District levels and the European unofficial representation at all levels in organizations formulating and carrying out policy, which they had been demanding. But the Government did not accede to popular demands that it declare the Emergency an armed rebellion and provide for courts of summary justice and the distribution of land belonging to rebels among loyal Kikuyu. And none of the top advisers of the Governor, whose heads the European community had been crying for, had been removed.

The majority of the European Elected Members, as one of them, Group Captain Briggs, told a meeting of the Mount Kenya Association at Nyeri on April 11, were "by no means satisfied with the arrangements made. We have had to decide whether we should accept these arrangements and try to make them work, or whether we should withdraw all co-operation from the Government and go into 100 percent opposition or else tender our resignation as a body." The latter would have been a popular gesture but it would have been disastrous to plunge the country into an election during the emergency, and the majority of the Elected Members agreed it was their duty "to try and make the new arrangements work." They made it clear, however, that they were "not prepared to accept responsibility without power" and that if after a period of perhaps a month they found that they were still "suffering from lack of decision and delay in decision on the part of Government" they would then have to adopt one of the two drastic steps, "resignation as a body or withdrawal of all co-operation from Government."

The European Elected Members' Leader, Mr. Michael Blundell, following this line, urged the full cooperation of the unofficial European community in the new setup, during a speech at the Annual Meeting of the Rift Valley Branch of the Electors' Union. While not wanting to "throw out masses of honey" he said "Government is part of the weapon with which we have to fight Mau Mau, and to blunt that

weapon is a folly to ourselves." When a speaker sought to amend a resolution to read the Government "has lost completely the confidence of the country" instead of "is rapidly losing the confidence of the country", Mr. Blundell told him there had been 188 Mau Mau terrorist casualties in the previous two weeks and that wasn't bad. He also "agreed that if Unofficial European co-operation at all levels is accepted by Government, we in our turn will accept that there will be no constitutional changes in portfolios during the Emergency."

Two of the European Elected Members did not agree with the majority decision to continue to support the Government and urge their constituents to have confidence in the Government and in the Members' support of the Government. One of them, Mr. Humphrey Slade, told his constituents at a series of three meetings that he had finally reached the stage where, in view of the continuing indecision and delay on the part of Government, he no longer had any confidence in the capacity of Government, as now operating, to end the Emergency. He criticized the "apologetic air" in the Government's approach, and its failure to use the transit camps to separate loyal Kikuyu from the others, to declare a state of rebellion, to establish summary justice courts and to provide for the forfeiture of rebels' land. He did not resign from the Legislative Council and the Elected Members' Organization did not wish him to resign from the Organization although he had offered to do so. He maintained that he had unshaken confidence in the other Elected Members, that they were all unanimous as to the measures which must be taken and differed only on the timing of their declaration of lack of confidence in the Government. This assertion was repeated in a statement issued by the European Elected Members' Organization a few days ago. The Elected Members, it said, "are ... in complete agreement as to what are the proper objectives during the Emergency ... but it cannot be expected that all will hold the same views respecting the tempo and day-to-day tactics of their task ..." The statement went on to list the principles on which the Members were in agreement; these included quick justice and the recognition that terrorists were committing rebellious acts and the punishments should be commensurate.

It is not clear whether one European Elected Member, Mr. S.V. Cooke, Member for the Coast, who had earlier broken with the Elected Members' Organization and had been asked to resign from it had returned to the fold when this statement was made. He had claimed at an earlier meeting that the Organization had acquiesced in half measures and therefore must share the blame with the Government for the mishandling of the Emergency. He declared, "But they haven't got a policy. They are like a lot of garrulous old women who interminably discuss what shall be done and wind up by deciding that nothing shall be done." He criticized the continuance in office of high government advisers to the Governor, who, he implied, should have been removed, the appointment of Major-General Hinde who had had no previous experience with terrorist organizations and the removal of squatters from farms to the reserves. He insisted the Emergency be called a rebellion, that present African leaders be replaced by those whom the Government would trust, that land escheated from rebels be handed over to loyal Kikuyu as a reward, that a system of speedy justice be initiated, and that an overall Commander be appointed and new officials be brought in at the top - he claimed that it was a delusion to believe Major General Hinde had the status of overall Commander and that the new Emergency Committee was just another name for the old Emergency Council.

The organ of the Elected Members' constituents, the Electors' Union was less satisfied with the new setup than the majority of the Elected Members. Its

Executive Committee passed a resolution expressing continuing dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Emergency was being handled and demanding the implementation of a system of summary justice, the implementation of Section 69 of the Native Lands Ordinance in an amended form to enable the escheatment of native lands of rebels and their distribution among loyal Kikuyu, and the empowering of the Director of Operations to declare any area an area of military operations from which the public may be excluded. The resolution stated that failure to give effect to the first two points by the end of April and to accept in principle the third point "justifies the sending of a delegation to make the necessary representations to the Secretary of State for the Colonies." The head of the Committee, Mr. Clive Salter, subsequently denied, in a letter to the East African Standard, that the Executive Committee, in passing this resolution, had presented an ultimatum to the Government or said that a delegation would go to London if the demands were not met. The Committee, however, was sharply reprimanded by one Elected Member who wrote to the Standard that he had ascertained his own constituents' views and did not accept the implication that he had to consult the Electors' Union Executive Committee to know what they were thinking. The Committee's proposal to send a delegation to the UK had the appearance of "shortcircuiting the Elected Members."

At present a kind of unanimity on principle exists among the European Elected Members on the steps which should be taken - some of which are unacceptable to Government. While the majority are continuing to cooperate with officials, a minority, insisting on a swifter pace, have already declared no confidence in the government. The rift between Government and the European unofficial community appears to be widening. The majority of the Elected Members, in the uncomfortable middle, may find it impossible to maintain for long their present policy of support and cooperation with the Government.

Since I wrote ^{several officials of} last/the Indian Government have denounced the "repression" of Africans in Kenya and Nehru is reported to have made representations to the UK Government on the dangers he sees in "denial of rights to Africans" in Kenya, announcing that if direct conflict between Africans and Europeans continued to develop Indian sympathies would lie with the Africans. Joseph A.Z. Murumbi, Secretary-General of the Kenya African Union (KAU), and another KAU official, Mr. Odinga, are now in India - ostensibly to study community development projects and cooperative societies, but more likely to strengthen Afro-Indian sympathies. The headquarters of the Kenya African Union and Mr. A.B. Fant, Commissioner for India in East Africa, have denied the allegation by the European Electors' Union that Murumbi had gone at the invitation of the Indian Government; KAU claims it arranged and paid for the trip and Mr. Fant insists he did not arrange the visit. However, Mr. Philip Mumford, whom I met at Oxford and later at the Kapenguria Trials which he was reporting for the Spectator, claims that Murumbi confided to him and Mrs. Mumford that he, Murumbi, had been invited by the Indian Government. It seems likely that Murumbi went to India under the wing of Diwan Chaman Lal, a member of India's Upper House (said to be a close friend of Nehru) who was the second member of Kenyatta's Defence Counsel at Kapenguria. Murumbi has been introduced to many important figures in India.

As KAU headquarters put it, "He did not go to India on a political delegation but neither was he denied by KAU the right to express his feelings on any

affairs of Kenya should the occasion arise for him to do so." Many such occasions arose and Mr. Murumbi is quoted as having given Indian officials and the press a spate of wildly colored tales - of men being mercilessly flagged, women raped and children shot; that the white settlers had been given the right to shoot at sight to kill, were exercising the right without discrimination and were attacking villages regularly on the pretext of hunting down Mau Mau. In a blind race for domination the British had let loose a barbaric terror on all Africans, including those who were not associated with Mau Mau. As the result of Murumbi's visit, an India-Africa Committee has been formed under Diwan Chaman Lal's sponsorship to present to Indians "a correct picture of the situation in Africa" and to mobilize moral and material support for the African "freedom movement." It claims to have 120 founder-members drawn from all parties in Parliament, the chief Ministers of State and members of State legislatures.

The European Electors' Union Executive Committee passed a resolution expressing grave concern at "the mounting evidence of Indian interference in Kenya's affairs" and urging the Elected Members "to represent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that criticisms expressed by Mr. Nehru are based on unreliable information, ... and that they were unfriendly coming from a member of the Commonwealth."

At this point the Non-Muslim Indian Elected Members in the Kenya Legislative Council and the leading Indian political organizations in Kenya - which in the past had worked rather closely with KAU - finally made their position clear. As might have been expected, they disassociated themselves from the extreme pro-African position of the Indian Government. There was a meeting in Nairobi called by the Nairobi Indian Congress at the request of its parent organization the Kenya Indian Congress. Mr. A.B. Patel, Member of Legislative Council for the Non-Muslim Eastern area and Mr. C.B. Madan and Mr. Chanan Singh, Members for the Non-Muslim Central area spoke. Mr. Patel repeated his views later at a meeting of Mombasa's Indian Association. In brief they denounced the Europeans and Mau Mau, while recognizing legitimate African aspirations, and criticized the Indian Government.

Mr. Patel said the Europeans were largely responsible for the Emergency because they had for years acted in a spirit of arrogance to enforce a policy of racial segregation and to serve their own interests at the expense of others - thus largely obscuring their contribution to the development of the area - and he urged them to embark on a new policy of social order based on merit and equal opportunities. Both Patel and Madan criticized the unofficial Europeans for making demands for greater political power during the Emergency and for condemning the Government. This they claimed had increased distrust of Europeans and lack of confidence in the Government by other races. Madan welcomed the Government's announcement that there would be no changes in the unofficial representation in Government during the emergency, but he criticized the appointment at the district level of unofficial Europeans to official posts (he was probably referring to the new post of Executive Officer) and insisted that if unofficials were to participate in the administration, the posts should be distributed among all races. "If the Europeans get in by the back door during these days of the Emergency I know it will be very difficult to oust them."

The Indian speakers expressed their continued sympathy for the legitimate aspirations of the Africans for educational, political and economic advancement but condemned Mau Mau, repeating the Indian Congress's advice to the Africans that violence would not get them anywhere. Patel firmly denied the accusation of a London newspaper that the Indian community, especially the Hindus, were sponsoring the Mau Mau. He cited instances where the Indian community had suffered terribly at the hands of the terrorists and had lost their lives as sufficient proof that Hindus were not encouraging the movement. He also deprecated a "whispering campaign" among Kenya Europeans that the Asians were conspiring to take control of the Colony. The Indians, Patel claimed, had a particular reason for denouncing violence of any kind. "The Europeans, with their strong military forces, and the Africans with their great numbers, could look after themselves if order was completely broken down in the country, but the Asian community would be the greatest sufferers." The Asian Members, Madan stated, had begged Government for compulsory military training and the appointment of an Asian Director of Manpower in order to muster Asian forces to combat terrorism. The Government had refused, and he wanted this on record lest the Asians be accused afterwards, as they were after World War II, of doing nothing to defend the country in time of need. The Asian community was also strongly resentful of the policy of Government of refusing Asians automatic firearms. They were officially advised to form themselves into Home Guards and go out on patrols by day and night - but they had to do this unarmed.

Having condemned both the Europeans and the Mau Mau, Patel urged the Indians to take a middle course, to be neither pro-European or anti-African, and to become a bridge between the other communities. Though appearing to be a courageous plague-on-both-your-houses, this move is primarily a fence straddling device.

Most important, perhaps, was the general condemnation by the Indian leaders of the Indian Government's attitude. Mr. Patel said "I think the Government of India is not correctly informed about events in this country and it is the function of the Indians here to see that the facts are understood." He denounced as "absolute lies" statements by officials and newspapers in India that Asians in Kenya had joined with the Europeans to suppress African aspirations. Mr. Madan deprecated statements by statesmen in New Delhi and Indian newspapers that there was only repression against the Africans. He said these "lopsided" reports put the "Indian community in a very false picture." "It is only those who are living under conditions of constant terror, uncertainty of life, insecurity of property, and the ever present fear of being murdered by day or by night, who can appreciate the significance of the activities being carried out by the adherents of the Mau Mau movement. People living thousands of miles away who rely upon second-hand information and who make authoritative and categorical statements about what is going on in this Colony, are, in my opinion, prejudicing the Indian community here." (Except for the last few words it might have been a European settler speaking about the "liberals" at home in England.) The Mombasa meeting passed a resolution asking the Indian Government to send a fact-finding mission to Kenya so that the true position could be made known in India.

It appears that the Indian Government, in opposing British colonialism and attempting to garner African nationalist support, had alienated no small number of the Indians resident in Kenya. The tenuous collaboration between African and Indian political organizations, which has undoubtedly been encouraged since the


war by the Indian Government, and which posed a formidable opposition to the European settlers, ^{now} seems unrevivable. The Indian Government has chosen to back the Africans rather than the Kenya Indians, leaving the latter severed from both the present African leaders and the Europeans. This does not mean, however, that there are no Indians in Kenya today who would not go down the line with the Indian Government and the current KAU leaders. A substantial number of them are gathered in nationalistic spirit around Mr. Pant, who as High Commissioner, has been very energetic in stimulating Indian nationalism in East Africa.

The Kenya Asiatic Muslim community, which, by its own demand, has legislative representation apart from other Indians, has not attempted any kind of collaboration with African political leaders. One of its leaders has also made his position clear. Sir Eboo Pirbhai, Nominated Muslim Member of the Legco, declared that the Emergency was not the time for expressions of "no confidence" in the Government or loose talk by fanatics of any race about self government, and he appealed for a united front of all people of good will to give the Government complete support in the overthrow of Mau Mau. He denounced irresponsible statements by unscrupulous elements in Europe and Asia who were trying to make political capital out of half truths. He realized the Africans had legitimate grievances and he believed these were capable of amicable assuagement, but there was no short cut through violence. Peace had to be established and the Africans would have to qualify by their conduct during the Emergency before their complaints could be studied. For the more successful prosecution of the fight against Mau Mau he suggested granting greater executive powers to the District Commissioners and police officers who had an intimate on-the-spot knowledge of the situation.

Do events outlined above signify decisive progress against the Colony's problems, or merely further milling around and superficial change? Mostly the latter. In Headquarters jargon one can prate of "improved means of formulating and applying policy", of "better organization, coordination and integration of effort," but in plain language there is not much to show.

The ingredients of murder continue to blend in the Kikuyu reserves and city slums. People detached from their roots with nothing to do and nothing to lose nurse grievances, fancied or real. New restrictions and confinements bottle the normally festive energies of the Kikuyu male - and this in a tribal society with kudos and female favors for masculine derring-do. Searching for something in white experience to match, I remembered the jungle monotony of a stalemated infantry war, where a group of young Americans, lolling in dirty fatigues in moist equatorial heat, were persuaded often enough to break the monotony by improvising extra duty sniping or grenading parties, and finding absorbing relief in a few suicidal minutes of wild shooting, high excitement, and grotesque antics of risking limb and life, humorously recountable afterward. You can name many contrasts between this and fragments of the Kenya violence, and the least significant would be that here the killing is not sanctioned by law. But to me the similarities are striking.

Sincerely,



John B. George