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CRISIS IN CROATIA
Part II: Facilis Decensus Averno

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They came to power on a platform of "Decentralization, De-étatization, De-politicization, and Democratization."[1] They were hailed as paladins of "liberal" communism and a pluralistic concept of socialist society. They were regarded, correctly, as the pupils, creatures, and heirs of Vladimir Bakarić, the man who had played the key role in bringing about the overthrow in 1966 of Aleksandar Ranković and his security police, the symbols and guarantors of "neo-Stalinist centralism, bureaucratism, and greater-Serbian hegemonism" and the men whose political destruction had opened the gates to the realization of that "socialist democracy" which found its most articulate political spokesmen in Bakarić and his pupils. They were young, born between 1923 and 1929, and therefore also symbols of the new generation of educated, "modern" Communists who were supposed to be consistent fighters against the authoritarian dogmatism of those whose political formation had taken place under Stalinism. They were dynamic and attractive, so that the chief among them had been called "the Yugoslav Kennedy" by his admirers.

They came to power in the late 1960s, and in December 1971 they fell from power. In their fall, they were accused by Bakarić and others of pandering or conversion to nationalism and chauvinism, of using dictatorial or "neo-Stalinist" methods against opponents and colleagues, and of seeking to establish a quasi-fascist state in which the dictatorial rule of a political clique of (ex?) Communists and nationalists in alliance with a new middle class of industrial managers and "technocrats" would be disguised by socialist rhetoric and by a nonparticipatory pseudomobilization of the masses, deluded by nationalism and by lies projecting the blame for all their ills onto another nation.

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If both descriptions are true, this is the stuff of which Greek tragedy (also a Balkan invention?) is made. It is the purpose of this series of Reports to argue that both are in fact true, at least *in grosso modo*, and to trace the path that leads from the first to the second.

Miko Tripalo was born in 1926 in Sinj, a small town in the barren Dalmatian hinterland. He joined the Communist-led Partisan resistance movement when it began in 1941, at age 15, and he entered the Party in 1943, when he was 17. Politics have been his career ever since: a Communist youth leader after the war and President of the Federation of Yugoslav students from 1953 to 1955: a member of the Central Committee of the all-Yugoslav Party in 1958; a member of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Party from 1962 and its Secretary from 1966 to 1969. In 1969 he became one of Croatia's two representatives on the new and supreme Executive Bureau of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and in 1971 he became one of Croatia's three representatives on the 23-member state Presidency created that year as an "after-Tito" collective head of state.

Dr. Savka Dabčević-Kučar, a professor of economics at Zagreb University and Europe's first woman prime minister when she became head of the Croatian government in 1967, was born in 1923 on the Dalmatian island of Korčula. She joined the Party and the Resistance in 1943. She became a member of the Croatian Central Committee in 1959 and of the Executive Committee in 1963. In 1969 she moved from the Premiership of the Croatian government to the Presidency of the Croatian Party.

Pero Pirker was born in 1927 in Varaždin, a major provincial city in the Croatian heartland northeast of

Zagreb. He joined the Party in 1945, served as a youth and later Party leader in Zagreb, was the city's Mayor from 1963 to 1967, and replaced Tripalo as Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Party in 1969.

Marko Koprtla was born in 1929 in a village near Županja, a dusty market town on the Sava River in ethnically mixed Slavonia. He joined the Party in 1947 and has been a "professional political worker" since 1955. A member of the Croatian Central Committee since 1964, he joined the Executive Committee in 1969 with special responsibility for "cadre" (personnel).

In 1965, when I lived in Zagreb, all of these later protagonists in the great drama (except Koprtla, whom I do not remember hearing about then) were rising young stars in the Croatian and Yugoslav political firmament, widely praised and admired as Bakarić's "whiz kids." They were then playing an energetic and central role in the struggle to implement a major package of liberalizing economic measures adopted in July 1965, known to Yugoslavs as the Reform, and to parry the sabotaging thrusts of Ranković and his friends who were still trying by all means to discredit the Reform and overthrow the reformers. All of them, with Bakarić, were present at a Zagreb diplomatic cocktail party that happened to take place on the evening of July 1, 1966, the day Ranković fell. A friend who was there told me afterward: "I didn't think anyone could be more delighted with today's news than I was, but *their* glee was downright indecent!" It was impossible and at the time unimportant to determine to what extent their joy was that of Croats, who had just seen the incubus of an impending and already partly real Serbian dictatorship lifted from them, and to what extent it was that of socialist democrats welcoming the destruction of one of the principal barriers to the modernization and democratization of Yugoslav communism.

Around this group were other bright, well-educated, active young people full of new enthusiasm, working feverishly in an excited atmosphere that vacillated from optimism (when the Reform was adopted) to grim pessimism (when, because of Ranković, "nothing happened" through the winter of 1965-66). Typical of these was Krešo Džeba, then the economic correspondent of the Zagreb morning newspaper, *Vjesnik*, whose excellent serialized analysis of the Reform and personal counsel were important to Fieldstaff descriptions of the changing Yugoslav economic system. Five years later Džeba was a member of the Croatian Central Committee and editor-in-chief of *VUS* (*Vjesnik u Srijedu*), a magazine whose liveliness and combativeness had rightly made it the largest circulation weekly in the country. There he suffered the fate of the erstwhile political whiz kids: a euphoric *VUS* became, week by week, more outspoken and intransigent in its interpretation and defense of Croatian national interests; Tito and others, as we now know, included *VUS* and its editor in their closed-session warnings to the Croatian leadership through the spring and summer of 1971; and when nothing happened, Tito at Karadjordjevo publicly accused the magazine of printing chauvinist articles. Three weeks later, perceiving the battle to be lost, Džeba (along with the director and the editor-in-chief of *Vjesnik*) resigned. In February 1972 he was thrown out of the Party.[2]

After Ranković

The fall of Ranković, the humbling of the security police, and subsequent organizational reforms affecting both Party and state institutions opened the doors to a redistributive decentralization of primary decision-making power in which a stable and effectual new constellation of forces stubbornly failed to appear. In the ensuing political confusion only two things were clear. The first was that the principal agents in Ranković's fall had been Republican barons like Bakarić and his peers in other non-Serb regions, backed by the increasingly autonomous Republican Party machines which they controlled and which Ranković had been unable to penetrate. With their power augmented by prestige born of this role and by identification with the cause of decentralization, democratization, and "self-management," the ideological winning side in the struggle with Ranković, these Republican centers and not the constitutional organs of "self-management" were now the penultimate arbiters, under Tito, of Yugoslav politics. Yugoslavia was on the way to becoming a confederation in which the center would be powerless without the unanimous consent of the regions.

Secondly, it was also clear that the Serbs, collectively identified with Belgrade as a symbol of "anti-self-management" centralism, étatism, and authoritarianism—a dangerous oversimplification—were

BAKARIĆ AND HIS PROTEGEES: (Top) Miko Tripalo and Vladimir Bakarić in happier days, at the VI Congress of the League of Communists of Croatia, 1968. Near the End of the Road: (Bottom) Bakarić and Savka Dabčević-Kučar during the "Freedom 71" military maneuvers, near Karlovac in Croatia, October 1971.

considered by others and often tended to consider themselves the "losing side"in the battle that Ranković had lost.

In this context it was immediately obvious to at least some of us that four dangers might threaten the victory of the reformers. They could fail to produce promised (largely economic) results, either through lack of ability and poor planning, because of the magnitude and complexity of the problem, or because too many instruments necessary to implement their program remained in other hands. Secondly, there could be a Serbian nationalist backlash, which might unite all Serbs—40 per cent of the country's population—on a "conservative" platform understood or disguised as the defense of Serbian national interests and as revenge for a Serbian national humiliation. Thirdly, there was the danger that some of the other nationalities, intoxicated by what was widely interpreted as their national triumph and led by either incompetent or irresponsible leaders, would indulge in excesses of national euphoria that would also bring about a "conservative" backlash by raising the specters of chauvinism and the disintegration of the state. Finally, there was a danger that the "liberal coalition" of 1965-66 might break up into its component parts when the process of redistributing the former power of their common centralist enemy exposed important differences in their own interests and objectives.[3]

All four of these dangers in fact materialized, although sometimes in unanticipated ways, and each had its specific impact on the shifting focus of Croatian politics.

The Reform had been hastily concocted by politicians who had only half listened to their economic advisers and in their haste had put aside until later hotly disputed but vitally important matters like the distribution of former Federal funds and obligations. To the resulting conceptual defects were added faulty and partial implementation, the inability of many enterprises to adapt to changed rules and market conditions, and bad luck in the form of unhelpful developments in the world market beyond Yugoslavia's borders. The result was an exaggeration and prolongation of difficulties anticipated in the transition to the new system. Yugoslavia suffered rising unemployment, high inflation rates, taxes that took more of industry's net revenue rather than less, increasing emigration, general economic stagnation, and a negative balance of payments saved from the disaster level only by tourism and emigrant remittances.

For a variety of reasons Croatia was among the regions hardest hit by most of these phenomena. It was also the principal earner of foreign currency from tourism and from remittances, because the Dalmation coast is Croatian and 37 per cent of Yugoslavs working abroad are from Croatia. Meanwhile, many fiscal powers, most foreign currency earnings, and a large share of the total Yugoslav investment fund remained concentrated in Belgrade, the Federal and Serbian capital. This had happened, despite the intention of the Reform, partly because of continuing deadlock over those changes in the system on which there had been no agreement in 1965 and partly either because of Serbian wiles (according to non-Serbian nationalists) or because expensive commitments to slow-maturing major investments in infrastructure (mainly in Serbia and the South), made on the eve of the Reform and on the assumption of continuing high growth rates, had to be honored in a period of recession and nongrowth.

Such a situation offered powerful ammunition to Croatian politicians continuing the struggle against the remains of central redistributive power and also to Croatian nationalists seeking a new platform for anti-Yugoslavism and anticommunism, both identified with anti-Serbianism.

A Serbian nationalist backlash did appear in the months after the fall of Ranković. As described in several earlier Fieldstaff Reports, it took the form of what is popularly called the Serbian "political underground," defined as an unholy alliance of Ranković's followers (Ranković himself, ever loyal to Tito, has made no known political move since his fall) with former Stalinists and Cominformists, "new left" students and intellectuals, and even former Royalist Chetniks. For a time it appeared that a "Serbian question" was replacing the "Croatian question" as Yugoslavia's most urgent perennial problem. The reasons why this danger never fully materialized are not only important in themselves but also provide an instructive counterpoint to parallel developments in Croatia. It was Serbian nationalism and no other that was disgraced along with and because it was identified with Ranković, "integral Yugoslavism," conservative communism, and centralism. Individuals rightly or wrongly suspected of overt or covert

Serbian nationalism were removed from leading positions and by 1968 a new leadership had taken over the Serbian Party. As young and "liberal" as their counterparts in Croatia, they happened fortuitously to be abler politicians and, of special importance, they were by process of selection untainted with Serbian nationalism in its traditional form, which is always "hegemonistic" and thus centralist and authoritarian.[4] The skill and unique comprehension with which they used the arsenal of political manipulation and ideological "open polemics" that is supposed to be a modern Yugoslav Communist's only legitimate weaponry in dealing with opponents is a separate and fascinating study, but the result was to leave frustrated Serbian nationalists at least temporarily disaggregated and ineffective.

The situation in Croatia was quite different. Croation national sentiment and legitimate Croatian grievances had been powerful motive forces in the resistance to and overthrow of centralist "unitarism" and were in no way discredited by recent events. For anyone who was in Zagreb in the summer of 1966, experiencing the euphoria provoked by the fall of Ranković and the almost universal tendency to interpret it as primarily a victory for Croatian interests, it was obvious that it would take a team of extraordinarily level-headed and able leaders to channel enthusiasm in the desired direction of mobilization for further reforms while forestalling a display of nationalism that could get out of hand or at least strengthen the "conservative" opposition by appearing to endanger civic peace and the stability of the multinational community.

The first crisis came within nine months. In March 1967 a group of 130 prominent Croatian intellectuals, 80 of them Communists, signed a declaration calling for a complete official distinction between the Croatian and Serbian languages, heretofore legally treated as variants of one language (Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian), and an end to alleged discrimination against the Croatian variant.[5] A political uproar and an almost hysterical campaign against nationalism followed. The signatories of the Declaration (and with them the 45 Serbian writers, half of them also Communists, who drafted a responsive demand for legal recognition of "Serbian" and the Cyrillic alphabet for the Serb minority that comprises 15 per cent of the population of Croatia) were anathematized and some of the Communists lost their Party memberships.

In October the Croatian Central Committee purged one of its most distinguished members, Većeslav Holjevac, a respected former Mayor of Zagreb and member of the Croatian government. He was accused of "nationalistic deviations" in his leadership of the Center for Croatian Emigrants, a quasi-governmental institution then considered a nationalist hotbed. For outsiders who knew Holjevac and his career, this was even interpreted as an excess of zeal.

For a time it seemed that the Croatian leadership would prove willing and able to maintain in practice as well as declaratively a struggle on two fronts—against what it chose to consider Croatian nationalism at home and against "the relics of bureaucratic centralism" in Belgrade. In 1968 the spotlight on nationalism shifted to the Kosovo Autonomous Province in southern Serbia, where ethnic Albanians, locally a majority, were celebrating their own recent emancipation from total and brutal Serbian hegemony with violent demands for more of the same and a Republic of their own.

Meanwhile, and as predicted, another kind of falling out over the spoils of former central power was taking place among erstwhile allies, this time functionally rather than ethnically defined. The essential issue was and is the proper future distribution of effective decision-making power, especially in the economy, among four kinds of centers: Republican and Provincial Party-state apparatuses, communes (the 500 basic territorial-political units), enterprise managers and other "technocrats," and what Yugoslav theory calls "self-managers" or (in this context) "the working class." In effect this last means those employed in the socialist sector of the economy, a kind of broad-based proletarian elite whose interests are aggregated and demands transmitted through specialized representative and professional organizations, including workers' councils and trade unions. A fifth candidate, a residuary legatee who might be left with more than anyone else had intended, is the Federation.[6]

For the Croatian political situation the function of this dimension of the conflict was twofold: it created new possibilities for new alliances, but it also made it difficult for both actors and observers to understand what was happening and to choose sides accordingly. The latter confusion derived in part from the rules of the game—all players are obliged to "stand on the

platform of the League of Communists" and therefore must use the same ideological labels and epithets to describe themselves and their opponents, obscuring real differences—and in part from the fact that the "functional dimension" of the dispute described above represents analytical categories more than it does roles and intentions as perceived by the actors. It is only since Karadjordjevo that one can sift from often tedious but sometimes insightful "Marxist analyses" of the sources of the crisis an at least tentatively convincing picture of the social strata and interests involved in these shifting alliances and their effect on the then Croatian leadership. This is an essential part of the story that follows.

The Croatian Strategy

By 1968 the prevailing atmosphere in Yugoslavia was one of insecurity, drift, and a rising tide of dissent. The real legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the people rested on its heretofore proven ability in four fields: defense of the precarious independence of a small state on the East-West frontier and of the equally precarious "brotherhood and unity" of its quarrelsome ethnic groups, and the promotion of rapid economic development and of at least some visible advance toward a stable economic and political democracy. On all four fronts it was manifestly faltering. The post-Reform recession had become acute. In the aftermath of the Six Day War and the Greek military coup to the south, the occupation of Czechoslovakia to the north, and evidence of renewed Soviet fishing in troubled Balkan waters the security and independence of Yugoslavia seemed more precarious than at any time since Stalin's death. Both the Federal government and the central Party apparatus were paralyzed by the inability of regional leaderships to agree on key issues, there was an associated escalation of distrust and mutual recriminations among the ethnic communities, and many were coming to feel that a quarreling Communist elite that had lost its sense of purpose and ability to act decisively might be worse than one that had not. The universities provided a seismograph of dissent: "new leftist" in Slovene Ljubljana, nationalist in Croatian Zagreb, and a bit of everything in Belgrade.

As perceived by the Croatian Party leadership, the principal barrier to the solution of all these problems was to be found in the continued resistance to modernization and pluralism offered by the remaining bastions of "bureaucratic centralism," a label which focused attention on the Federal administration and the Federal Party apparatus. These bastions were held by "conservatives" and "unitarists," men who feared the mobilization and participation of the masses that was the declared goal of Party policy either because they feared democracy or because they were at heart Serbian nationalists resisting a loss of Serbian hegemony through such a process. Their strength lay in the economic instruments they continued to control, redistributive instruments whose use was particularly harmful to the interests of richer and more developed regions like Croatia and Slovenia.[7]

The political strategy of the Croatian leadership consequently concentrated on two targets.

They urged further decentralization and also further "democratization" of Party and polity. These should be achieved through relaxation of the rules of "democratic centralism," permitting minority voices to be heard, through an increased voice for ordinary citizens in direct, competitive elections and in distribution of enterprise earnings that would be larger because federal taxes and fiscal powers would be smaller after consistent reforms, and through a purge of older Communists unwilling or unable to play by the new rules. Part of their reasoning was certainly based on perceptions of political advantage: weakening "democratic centralism" would weaken the remaining power of the Federal Party center over the Croatian Party, while an opening to the masses was expected to strengthen the position of young, "modern" Communist leaders like themselves, who knew how to speak the language of the people and how to manage a more open political system. It was also a strategy which enabled them to label "unitarist" political opponents as old-fashioned, conservative, unprogressive, skeptical of socialist democracy and "self-management," and unjustifiably fearful of the ability of "socialist ideas" to triumph in an "open, democratic political dialogue and confrontation." There is no reason to think they were insincere in such labeling. When they spoke of purging such Communists they were thinking as much of their own Croatian "old guard" as they were of "centralists" in Belgrade.[8]

At the same time they specifically attacked continuing Federal control of most foreign currency (a hot issue in Croatia, which earns about 40 per cent of

all Yugoslav foreign currency), former Federal banks with seats in the capital and former Federal funds in their safes (one of the key issues not settled in the 1965 Reform), and certain wealthy foreign trade enterprises that had been founded, financed, and staffed by Serbian-dominated Federal institutions and capital before the reform and that were now exercising what the Croats regarded as an alarming and exploitive country-wide power based on these ill-gotten riches. The slogans were "federalization of former Federal capital" and "clear accounts" (*čisti računi*), which would allow each Republic to see what it was contributing to and getting from the Federation and to make appropriate decisions about future contributions.

In advancing these arguments the Zagreb leadership could claim with credibility that they were not only defending the interests of Croatian entrepreneurs and workers, and thus the Croatian nation. Theirs was also a defense of the interests of "producers" throughout Yugoslavia, who in Yugoslav Communist theory should have control over the "surplus value" of their labor that was being "expropriated" by Belgrade bureaucracy, Belgrade banks, and the grasping tentacles of those Belgrade-based foreign trade enterprises.

As yet unspoken but implicitly underlying this line of attack there was, however, another level of perceptions, this time ethnic but also not without partial historic justification. The metaphor for all that was outdated, centralist, and authoritarian was "Belgrade." Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. Serbia, whose notorious "Serbian bourgeoisie" had ruled and ruthlessly exploited richer, more sophisticated Croatia in prewar Yugoslavia, and who now, with Ranković and a Serbian-dominated Party and police bureaucracy, had recently attempted a repeat performance. Serbian politicians, primitive by education, hard-fisted by training and necessity, pro-Soviet by pan-Slav instincts, centralist by interest and tradition, and therefore "neo-Stalinist" or at least "dogmatic Communist" by definition. Serbian hegemony, exploitive and authoritarian, the primary—perhaps the only— reason why Croatia was not already as rich and democratic as...Denmark? The Croatian strategy had, from its birth, two faces: one national, one socialist. As early as 1967, before and after the language crisis, the new leadership had become sensitive to the charge that in their opening to the masses in the name of decentralization they were playing with Croatian nationalism.

Meanwhile, however, the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the national interests of the Croatian nation both called for "decentralization, de-étatization, depoliticization, and democratization." There was no contradiction, no conflict here, and the enthusiastic support of the Croatian masses—which, as in any society, meant the politicized minority that had found means to articulate its feelings—was further proof, if any were needed, that their course was correct. So, too, were their numerous allies in other Republics and regions; the Slovenes, whose anticentralist economic interests were the same; the Macedonians, whose defensive new nationalism and consequent fear of Serbian hegemony had come to weigh more heavily than the financial benefits they gained as an underdeveloped region from centralized redistribution of national income; and others, even in the new Serbian leadership, whose interests or ideological convictions made them also anticentralist. With such strength at home and elsewhere in the Federation and with growing self-confidence, Bakarić's disciples pressed their case uncompromisingly and vigorously.

The "Historic" Tenth Session

The stalemate at the Federal level nevertheless continued, preventing any effective, country-wide action to deal with increasingly acute economic and social problems. At the Ninth Party Congress in March 1969 Tito himself intervened with another attempted solution: a 15-member Executive Bureau superimposed on top of the entire Party and composed of the senior barons of each regional Party—Bakarić and Tripalo became Croatia's representatives. They would all live in Belgrade, above the strife and away from their bases of power. Unfettered by direct responsibility to their respective Parties and with institutional roles that made all of Yugoslavia their collective concern, they would be able to reach agreement, and because they were the recognized leading spokesmen of their respective regions the regional Parties would have to obey them.

It did not work. Problems persisted and grew in magnitude, and their persistence and the apparent incapacity of the system to produce decisions or action multiplied the ranks of the discontented, who tended to polarize around two extremes: exclusivist and paranoid nationalism or neocentralism. Caught between these two fires, the Croatian leadership took

a decision sometime around the middle of 1969 to concentrate on the one they considered more dangerous.

Bakarić himself explained the rationale of the choice and the pattern of future action in a speech to Republican Party leaders on December 13, 1969, and even more clearly in his remarks during the Tenth Session of the Croatian Central Committee a month later. These two events mark the public opening of a new phase in Croatian politics.[9]

He wished, Bakarić told the Tenth Session, to discuss both "Croatian unitarism" and "Croatian nationalism" as threats to the line of the Party. The historic roots of contemporary Croatian unitarism were to be sought in the fact that all founders of the Croatian Communist Party, except Tito himself, had been "Yugoslav nationalists" in their youth and had kept that "ballast" when they became Communists. Their unitarism was later reinforced by three successive events: the atrocities of the Croatian fascist Ustaše during the Second World War, the Cominform attack on Yugoslavia from 1948 to 1953, and the centralist system of Communist rule which was imposed after the war and which for many years enjoyed remarkable success in providing economic development and political stability. Unitarists therefore represented a strong, permanent current in Croatian communism, with many unitarists in or close to top Party and government bodies, capable of setting policy. Do they have a chance, Bakarić asked, of finding domestic (Croatian) allies and taking power? No, their time is past, unless they have external help: their strength lies in "bureaucratic centralism and Cominformism." Such a government and movement could therefore exist for a certain time, with such help, but the first crisis—"domestic or international"—would bring a repetition of the collapse and civil war of 1941-1945. "This possibility," he said, "still exists."

Croatian nationalism, on the other hand, never existed as an "enduring tendency" in the Croatian Communist Party, although individual nationalists often penetrated the Party, occasionally with some effect, as in 1937, 1944, and "in that Central Committee of which I was president." But they were never a serious current. Could nationalists therefore ever form a government? No, they are too divided, too confused as to goals, and too discredited by the Ustaše variant and its atrocities. Without direct prospects, therefore, traditional Croatian nationalism seeks a role inside the League of Communists, on a platform of criticism of Yugoslavia and its development. This, however, is entirely negative. On this basis they are capable only of "sabotage," but because they have no positive "real ideology or program," they are otherwise not dangerous. That they had admittedly become more "aggressive" in recent months was really only a sign that they were on the defensive and in retreat.

The occasion for both the December meeting and the Tenth Session of the Central Committee, which met from January 15 to 17, 1970, was a series of newspaper articles about Croatian nationalism written by a prominent Croatian politician and published in *Borba*, a "Federal" newspaper considered by the Croatian leadership to be centralist and anti-Croatian. The articles presented a detailed and documented analysis of the increasing activities of Croatian nationalists and suggested that the Party leadership had failed to take more than verbal action against the rising nationalist tide. Particularly incriminated in the series were the publications and other activities of the Matica Hrvatska, 130-year-old Croatian cultural organization that had played a distinguished and aggressive role in developing and defending Croatian national consciousness during the "Slav awakening" of the nineteenth century and in the bitter internationality struggles that marked the last decades of the Hapsburg monarchy. The *Borba* series portrayed the Matica as having fallen into the hands of nationalists and clericalists who were turning it again into a political organization in competition with the League of Communists.

The author of the articles was Miloš Zanko, born 1915, a member of the Croatian Central Committee and the Conference of the all-Yugoslav Party, a Vice President of the Federal Parliament, a Communist and Partisan in 1941, and an impassioned "Yugoslav" patriot for whose personal integrity and lack of political ambition there are convincing testimonials. The immediate purpose of the Tenth Session was his public condemnation and political liquidation "for views and actions . . . contrary to the policy and course of the League of Communists." His articles were interpreted as a malicious effort to discredit the Croatian Party leadership by labeling it soft on nationalism; their only purpose must therefore be to seek the overthrow of that leadership; since the present leaders enjoyed the full confidence of Croatian

Communists and the Croatian public, they could only be overthrown through outside intervention. Žanko must therefore be the witting or unwitting agent of such interventionists. Bakarić had already indicated, in his December 16 speech, where they were to be found: in the "Serbian *Čaršija*" (a Turkish word for marketplace, used as a derogatory term for Belgrade gossip), but *not* in the Serbian League of Communists, and "in a part of the Federal administration" which was attempting to maintain its power and to this end was "withholding from the public information about the nature of the difficulties facing the country."

The Tenth Session was later to become the totem of Croatian communism and the touchstone of "progressive" views which qualified both Communists and non-Communists for participation in Croatian politics. The principles of the Tenth Session, as interpreted by Tripalo, Savka, and Pirker in particular, began with a declaration of all-out struggle against "unitarism" and its advocates, considered the principal threats to democratic socialism and Croatian national interests. Croatian nationalism and nationalists, clearly defined and located, were also classified as alien and dangerous, but were considered a lesser threat at the present time. In the name of democracy the struggle against them could employ only "ideological-political" and indirect weapons: argument and positive action to solve the economic problems and end the "bureaucratic-centralist" exploitation of Croatia on which nationalism fed. To accomplish the latter purpose allies would be needed and should be sought (without, of course, any compromise of the principles of "self-management socialism") in mobilization of the masses, including non-Communists and even sometime nationalists won over by such a program, and in other Republics. The "Žanko case" had exposed the face of the principal enemy and that he was to be found inside Croatia as well as outside. Among first priorities must therefore be the forging of a monolithic Croatian front, requiring a domestic political house-cleaning in the name of self-management and Croatian national interests; the "homogenization of Croatia" soon became a favorite political phrase.

These were, indeed, the main themes of the Tenth Session. A careful rereading of the speeches made there also reveals, however, some subthemes, elaborations, and nuances worth noting in the light of subsequent events.

Several Central Committee members who were later to part company with the Tripalo-Savka-Pirker triumvirate significantly confined their remarks at the Tenth Session to attacks on Žanko's egotism in considering himself the only fighter against nationalism and his impropriety in publishing attacks on the leadership in *Borba* rather than voicing them at a Party meeting.[10]

Other speakers, elaborating on the twin subjects of Croatian nationalism and Yugoslav unitarism, revealed attitudes and details of evaluation that were to set the style of Croatian politics and determine the tactics of the Croatian Party in the months to come. Themes of greatest retrospective significance included:

- If Croatian Communists are not sensitive to Croatian national interests, others will be and will profit. Croatian nationalism flourishes on unsolved problems, and by solving problems and by education Communists can dry up the sources of nationalism. Nationalists say that Croatia is exploited, that Croatia fares worse than other Republics, that unproductive investments are found only outside of Croatia and are built with Croatian money, etc., and that this all happens at least partly because the League of Communists of Croatia and its Central Committee are a-national and therefore unable to protect Croatia and its interests.

- With the retreat under fire of "greater étatism (the hegemony of one nation)," Republican nationalism steps forward as a new base for étatist elements, who seek thereby to turn their defeat at the center into a victory at the regional level. This Republican nationalism has recently become "noisier" because of a stagnation in the development of self-management as an alternative to any form of étatism and because democratization tolerates such noise. The answer is not less democracy but more answering arguments and renewed progress toward self-management.

- The organizations and periodicals named by Žanko have indeed been guilty of indulging in unacceptable expressions of nationalism and of attempting to engage in unacceptable political activities. But there is nothing new in any of these purported "revelations;" the Central Committee is not only aware of these things but has taken firm political action to deal with them. Some organizations

and periodicals—for example, the Center for Croatian Emigrants (Holjevac), the Republican Institute for the Study of the Workers' Movement (Franjo Tudjman), and the shortlived periodical of the Writers' Association (*Hrvatski Književni List*)—have been cleansed or forced to stop publication, but always by "correct" political methods and never by "outdated" police methods. In the light of the success of this strategy, to continue to talk of the need to "pass from words to deeds," as Žanko does, can only mean advocating a return to Stalinist "administrative" (police) methods, totally unacceptable and contrary to the Party line.

- As for the Matica Hrvatska, which Žanko considered most dangerous of all, some articles and individuals should be criticized, and the Executive Committee has done this, but one should not generalize. There are enough disciplined Communists and other sound "self-management socialists" in the Matica to prevent its abuse and to frustrate those "who tried to turn the Matica Hrvatska from a cultural institution into a self-styled political representative of the interests of the Croatian nation."

- Croatia unfortunately has the largest and "worst" political emigration of any part of Yugoslavia. The organizations of these émigrés are becoming more aggressive and dangerous for a number of reasons. These include a more subtle strategy that pretends to accept many aspects of the socialist order in Yugoslavia, a recently revived interest on the part of their "foreign sponsors and foreign intelligence agencies" in the possibility that Yugoslavia might break up, and the opportunity for recruitment of a new generation inside Croatia presented by the rapidly growing number of Croats going to temporary work in Western Europe. The activities of these émigré organizations must be closely watched, and institutions like the Matica Hrvatska must be warned to beware of what may seem innocent cultural contacts with them.

- Unitarism is more dangerous than nationalism in part because it still has a "material base" in remaining instruments of central economic power, including the foreign currency system, continued concentration in one place (Belgrade) of capital and economic power inherited from the old economic system ("e.g., certain foreign trade enterprises"), and the investment and banking systems. Therefore, the struggle for the Reform is the same as the struggle against unitarism and as the struggle for true national freedom and development.

- The Croatian Party has long understood the unitarist threat, but so far has fought against it at the place of its principal power and economic and social roots, at the Federal center. In the future the Party must pay more attention to "unitarist conceptions" in its own midst. Unitarists can be recognized, inter alia, by their distrust of all national feeling, their tendency to treat even words like "Croat" and "Croatia" as suspect, reeking of the past and a threat to others, especially Serbs in Croatia. They also seek to "transform the view of those who declare themselves 'Yugoslavs,' in order to emphasize their citizenship of a socialist self-managing community, into an unacceptable concept of a Yugoslavism which signifies a superior, supranational concept that does not contain equality of nationalities and free expression of national sentiments."

- One of Žanko's crimes is that his kind of broadside attack on anything he thinks smells of nationalism does not contribute to the Croatian Party's basic effort to mobilize a wider stratum of the masses and broaden the base of support for its policies, a process which involves "not disqualifying people who do not always talk quite as we think they ought to." The Tenth Session, on the other hand, will prove very important and positive partly because "it mobilizes and through it we can mobilize both Communists and non-Communists, building bridges and opening dialogues without a single compromise with anyone." The old system is broken; a new generation comes. The Tenth Session opens the door to youth and the masses by its clear declaration that "old analyses by old hands are not valid, but new measuring rods for new relationships are necessary." In this context even manifestations of nationalism may not have their old significance, for in a complex modern situation "there are also people who go from black to white, and vice versa, sometimes nationalist and sometimes constructivist."

Meanwhile, as if to demonstrate in yet another way the contrast between modern, open, tolerant and humane Croatian communism and the dogmatic variety found farther east, a number of speakers took pains to emphasize that they were condemning Žanko's political activities and their effects, not impugning his intentions or his person. It was Miko Tripalo himself who pronounced an epitaph on

Žanko's political career that he may have had occasion to recall 23 months later:

"I still believe Comrade Žanko will see that he has labored in error, that he may have been supported in this action by parties who evidently have more dishonorable goals than Comrade Žanko even imagines. But naiveté in politics is not a virtue but a vice."[11]

Bakarić Proposes. . .

Although it is difficult to find proof in available documentation, there is no informed observer of the Yugoslav and Croatian scene who is not convinced that the Tenth Session was staged on the initiative of Vladimir Bakarić, and that it was meant to be part of a new master strategic plan concocted in the fertile but impenetrable mind of the grand old man of Croatian politics. Bakarić has always been an enigma, even to his closest friends from the days of prewar clandestine Party activity.[12] A quasi-invalid who frequently retires in illness or for contemplation to his retreat on the island of Hvar, a man who knows how to conserve his limited energy, he was the undisputed master of Croatia from the end of the war until 1969, when he became a member of the all-Yugoslav Party's new Executive Bureau and was even less frequently seen in a Zagreb he seemed willing to leave to his disciples. What really goes on in his mind may be hard to say, but he is undoubtedly the ablest politician, except Tito himself, that Croatia has produced in this century, and at every crucial moment in the history of postwar Yugoslavia his considerable weight has been thrown on the scales on the side of pragmatism and liberalization.

In this case, Bakarić's plan seems to have been to make an end run around the deadlock at the Party and state center and the consequent "stagnation" in the economy and self-management that were fueling dissent in both its nationalist and neocentralist forms. The center was inactive because of an inter-Republican stalemate on basic issues that had proved unbreakable. A Republican Party and government were not so hampered but needed adequate economic instruments (or "material means") with which to act, a legitimating constituency, and firm unity of cadre and conviction. Croatia, so armed and under the progressive leadership that Bakarić had trained, could set an example for the rest of the Federation of a successful, modern, democratic socialism. To this end the instruments must be acquired, support mobilized, and the leadership united—all at the Republican level. What was new in this strategy was that the effort to reform the system at the Federal level was temporarily given up; modern socialism could be built in one Republic.

If this was its purpose, there were four weaknesses in the strategy:

1. By its nature it would in the Croatian historical context attract offers of assistance from Croatian nationalists, dangerous allies from the Communist point of view. Bakarić recognized this, but discounted the danger (as we have seen) by arguing that the nationalists were disunited, unorganized, and had no positive program. Events were to prove him wrong.

2. Because national sentiment and a quasi-paranoid conviction that Croatia has been exploited by subordinate status in someone else's state for a thousand years are always very near the surface of most Croats' perceptions, it would prove temptingly easier to mobilize politically conscious Croats on a national platform than on any other. Because years of seemingly empty rhetoric about self-management have left few Yugoslavs (except, oddly enough, in top echelons of the political elite) with a passionate belief in its feasibility, it would prove correspondingly difficult to mobilize them on the alternative basis of "class" or "self-management."

3. By increasing the power and prestige of Republican apparatuses, and by casting Republican leaders in the role of indispensable mediators in the defense of class *and* national interests, the strategy was fundamentally "antiself-management" in tendency if not in conception. This may not have worried Bakarić; it is almost always impossible to say whether or not an individual Yugoslav Communist leader is cynical in his obligatory confessions of faith in the feasibility of universal self-management without political intermediaries. However, the existence and significance of this aspect of the strategy would not be unnoticed by one important social grouping, in addition to the Republican Party leaders, who stood to benefit from it. Managers and other members of the new Croatian "middle class" (an unfortunate term, because of its emotive connotations, used here *faute de mieux* and purely as a sociological label without normative implications) have no love for Belgrade centralism and all it implies but equally little

desire to live with a literal implementation of the theory of self-management without intermediaries. Everything in their experience and in the logic of their own roles cries out to them that such a system would be inefficient if not absurdly unworkable. Instinct and historic experience also suggest to them that a strong leadership that respects and supports their roles but also enjoys mass legitimacy—better yet, enthusiasm—as a *national* leadership would be the best defense against both horns of this dilemma.

4. To avoid compromising alliances with nationalists, to resist the temptation to take the easy road to mass support, and to escape becoming the instruments and guarantors of the rule of a middle class "technocracy" would require a high order of political skill, intellect, level-headedness, and ideological conviction and consistency on the part of a Party leadership, especially one distracted by and in need of allies in its struggle to push Croatian views about the power and competence of the Federation and further economic reforms in the face of determined opposition in Belgrade and elsewhere. The triumvirate and their friends were convinced that they possessed these qualities in more than sufficient measure,[13] but the coming months were to prove that they did not.

. . . But the Triumvirate Disposes

By early 1971, 12 months after the Tenth Session, Tripalo, Dabčević-Kučar, and their team had experienced a mixture of success and failure the quality and distribution of which convinced them they were on the right track and had defined their enemies and friends with accuracy.

Croatia was in the throes of a "national euphoria" (the phrase became a favorite of the leadership) without precedent since the founding of Yugoslavia. The Party leadership in general and Savka and Miko in particular enjoyed a mass popularity that can legitimately be compared to the popularity of Alexander Dubček during the Czechoslovak spring of 1968. Like Dubček, they reacted to the heady wine of such popularity with increased self-confidence and intransigence and soon became, in part at least, the prisoners of the aroused emotions of their mass audience.

The reorganization of Federal institutions and the reduction of the competences of the Federation had continued in the direction urged by Zagreb. Three months after the Tenth Session, in April 1970, the Yugoslav Party Presidium adopted a resolution recognizing the "sovereignty" of the Republics and provinces and defining Yugoslavia as "an institutionalized agreement and cooperation among the Republics." The competence of the Federation should be limited to foreign affairs, defense, and instruments necessary to guarantee a single market and economic system and ethnic equality. The Federal administration and the army should more consistently implement the principle of the "ethnic key" (strict proportional representation of all nations and nationalities) in personal policy. Commissions to watch over the implementation of the resolution were appointed. [14]

In September President Tito himself chose the occasion of a meeting with Croatian Party leaders in Zagreb to propose the creation of a collective state presidency, on which each Republic would be equally represented, to replace him. The need for a constitutional amendment to implement this proposal opened the doors to other institutional changes and a general reconsideration of the nature and structure of the Federation. Lengthy and heated arguments followed among Republican leaderships and members of a Constitutional Commission appointed to this end—the latter reaching agreement only after being "locked up" for a month in early 1971 on the Brioni islands, Tito's favorite retreat—but the results were close to the Croats' maximum demands. The 21 draft amendments to the Federal Constitution submitted to public discussion in March called for a very substantial additional transfer of power from the Federation to the Republics and provinces. Unanimity of all the Federal units was required for decisions in many remaining areas of Federal competence. Although the "unity of the market" and the safeguarding of the economic system would continue to be Federal concerns, most tax powers and revenues were to accrue to the Republics and provinces, which would thereby take over primary responsibility for economic planning and its implementation—a central Croatian demand. Republican and provincial parity or the "ethnic key" would provide the basis for constituting not only the new collective state Presidency but also most other important Federal organs and institutions, including the Federal Executive Council (the cabinet), the most powerful chamber in Parliament (the Chamber of Nationalities, already so constituted), and the personnel of the ministries. Territorial militia under Republican control, created

by a new defense law in 1969, received Constitutional sanction. The "sovereign" character of the Republics was confirmed, and it was left to them to define the basis of that sovereignty in detail in their own constitutions. [15]

Many outside observers saw in these changes the de facto conversion of Yugoslavia into a confederation. Croatian leaders like Tripalo and Savka Dabćević-Kučar openly hinted in public speeches that they deserved the lion's share of credit for it all and that they had been forced to make very few compromises. [16]

In the economic sphere, on the other hand, the Croatian leaders had so far failed to impose their views about what they considered vital issues, including reform of the banking and foreign currency systems and those wealthy Belgrade export-import firms, redistribution of former Federal assets and obligations, and the future of the residual Federal incentive subsidies represented by a peculiar post-Reform device called "extra-budgetary balances." Here they now made what in retrospect appears to have been a serious tactical error, which was to have ramified and consistently grave consequences. They pressed their case on each of these issues with an uncompromising intransigence that suggested that all their demands were fundamentally nonnegotiable.

There are several certain or probable reasons for such a stance. These issues involved the essential economic instruments without which the goal of full, effective Croatian political and economic autonomy would be unachievable. Without them the transfer to the Republics of responsibility for economic planning and control, sanctioned by the constitutional amendments, would remain empty of meaning. There would thus be no adequate guarantees that the developed north, including Croatia, would not continue to be "exploited" by the numerically preponderant, underdeveloped south even in a genuine parliamentary democracy after Tito's departure.

In addition, it is reasonable to assume that intoxication with a series of consistent victories in recent battles contributed to the intransigence of the leadership. Finally and more subtly, but of particular importance, they were on these issues for the first time specifically and tangibly the prisoners of their success in mobilizing mass enthusiasm on a national platform and in tolerating support, including the right to exert pressure and to criticize, by nationalist forces outside the disciplinary control of the Party's "pre-emptive" network of organizations. The more they insisted that their position on each issue represented vital Croatian interests, the more they found or felt it to be politically impossible to compromise on precisely these issues.

One important consequence was the loss of their allies outside Croatia. Slovene and Macedonian support, in particular, had been important in every fight with Belgrade since the Reform of 1965 and the fall of Ranković. For a time, in fact, the Slovenes had seemed the most intransigent of the decentralizers and in 1969 had caused a major scandal and minor crisis by publicly and vehemently protesting a Federal decision about the distribution of a World Bank loan for the construction of Yugoslavia's first superhighways. Afterward, however, the Slovenes had pulled in their horns, alarmed by the implications of a tendency toward Republican economic autarchy for an industrialized region heavily dependent on unfettered access to markets and raw materials in less developed areas and by the nationalist fellow-travelers being attracted by radical decentralization, whose growing strength might lead either toward separatism or a centralist reaction. Slovenes and with them the Macedonians, small nations on the outside edges of Yugoslavia and conscious of the need to form part of a larger state for economic viability and protection against jealous neighbors with past or present irredentist claims on their land, have usually valued a political and economic Yugoslav union more highly than the Croats, whose larger population and territory and particular history often encourage the feeling that they could go it alone if they chose. Now, relatively satisfied with achieved levels of decentralization and further alarmed by the implications of developments in Croatia, the Slovene and Macedonian leaders were increasingly ready to bargain and compromise in order to reach agreements that would get a sufficiently emasculated Federal mechanism moving again. With growing frequency the Croatian delegation found itself a minority of one in inter-Republican negotiations.

This isolation affected the Croatian leadership and their strategy in at least three ways. It confirmed them in their feeling that they must have firm institutional guarantees, including a veto right, to protect

each Republic against being outvoted in the Federation, a point of view that was pressed with growing emphasis in Croatia during the public debate on the 1971 amendments. Secondly, it increased the relative importance to them of the mass support they enjoyed inside Croatia and made them more dependent on its maintenance and unanimity; the "homogenization of Croatia," implying both the mobilization of non-Communists and the conversion or silencing of doubters and dissenters within the Croatian Party, assumed an even higher priority than before. Thirdly, the "internal logic" of both isolation and pretensions to mass support by all Croatians emphasized their role as primarily national and only secondarily Communist or "class" leaders, further affecting their political style and also, it seems reasonable to assume, their self-image.

A final consequence materialized only after mid-1971 and the adoption of the 21 amendments to the Federal Constitution. The amendments, as we have seen, created instruments and procedures for the negotiated resolution of inter-Republican disputes. The isolation of the Croats on this particular set of disputed issues meant that it was extremely unlikely that Croatian views would prevail in such negotiations without the compromises that the Zagreb leadership's domestic strategy had made it increasingly difficult for them to accept. In anticipation of continuing deadlock and the political inexpediency of compromise, they would be tempted to encourage or at least condone extraconstitutional pressures inside Croatia in support of their positions.

The "clear line of demarcation" drawn by Savka and others at the Tenth Session between progressive, nationally-conscious Croatian communism and Croatian nationalism began to evaporate. Their platforms had become increasingly hard to distinguish, in practice if not in ideology. Basing their opening to the masses on the claim that they were effectively defending Croatian national interests (equated, of course, with all-Yugoslav working-class interests, a less convincing claim since they had lost their allies in other Republics), the Croatian Party leaders had left themselves vulnerable to nationalist heckling, to the charge that they were insufficiently vigilant or successful in defining or defending these interests. Responding to such heckling in rhetoric and in deed, they placed themselves in a curious position. They had in effect if unintentionally legitimized Croatian nationalism as a political competitor for the allegiance of the "national movement" which they had themselves invoked, which was now essential to their own legitimacy and bargaining strength, and which they could hold only by outbidding the nationalists on the latter's own ground.

The Croatian "national euphoria," feeding masochistically on isolation and gaining strength from both the victories and the defeats of a leadership perceived as defending national interests, continued to grow in exuberance, visibility, and expectations. The national question, always at least the second subject in any conversation with most urban, politicized Croats, was now invariably the first and obsessive subject, whether in terms of historic or present injustice or of future hope and the accomplishments or failure of the present leadership. The change was atmospheric and difficult to describe: an exponential rise in intensity, in the magnitude of the catalog of real or rumored wrongs and in the occasions on which the catalog was volunteered, in sudden detailed knowledge about kinds and values of exploitation or about the number of Serbs who are directors of Croatian enterprises, commanders of Croatian regiments, or to be found in Croatian factories, on Croatian railroads, or on the Zagreb police force.

"Nationalist excesses" occurred with growing frequency. They ranged from the midnight destruction of an advertising sign in the Cyrillic (Serbian) alphabet by a gang of youths wearing armbands inscribed with the Croatian national emblem—a red and white checkerboard—to demonstrations in which the Croatian flag and coat of arms appeared without the obligatory red star, a political struggle to oust an enterprise director because he was a Serb, a serious riot after a football victory over a Serbian team, or a village street brawl in an ethnically mixed area. Most were trivial incidents, but they were enough to fire the emotions of peoples only 30 years from civil war and attempted mutual genocide.

The reaction of the Croatian government and Party leadership was also instructive: such "excesses" were verbally condemned, but with few exceptions no action was taken and in a number of cases local and sometimes Republican officials expressed sympathy with the motives and intentions of the perpetrators. The top leadership, consistent with the views they had expressed at the Tenth Session, said that incidents of this sort were regrettable but

understandable "marginal" phenomena accompanying a difficult political and social transition. Their importance should not be exaggerated or used as an excuse to distract attention from the struggle for the amendments, the Reform, and Croatia's justified demands for changes in the banking and foreign currency systems, etc., nor should they provide an excuse for a return to dictatorial "firm hand" methods of dealing with problems. Like the national euphoria itself, after all, even "excesses" were further evidence of mass support, a little misfocused in this case, for the "correct line of the Party, based on the Tenth Session." They were also useful, in negotiations with Belgrade, as reminders that Croatian nationalism might indeed get out of hand and constitute a threat if the demands of the Croatian Party leadership were not met, enabling them to keep control by demonstrating that Croatian Communists were well able to defend legitimate national interests.

At this point and on this issue the Croatian leadership split.

NOTES

1. The "four D's" description of the program of the Reform of 1965 was coined by one of Croatia's most distinguished economists, the late Rudolph Bićanić ("Economics of Socialism in a Developed Country," in *Foreign Affairs* [July 1966], p. 643).

2. While this Report was in process of publication, Džeba was accused by his former comrades in the Croatian Journalists' Association of more serious misbehavior: misuse of his position as President of the Association to insure its domination by journalists from the *Vjesnik* house and Zagreb Radio-Television, with them to "manipulate" Croatian journalism, and in this way to create a monopolistic position for biased reporting in support of the nationalist platform of the then Party leaders and in violation of journalistic ethics. He is also charged with seeking to take the Croatian Association out of the Yugoslav Journalists' Federation (*Politika*, June 13, 1972, reporting a Special Assembly of the Association).

3. Dennison I. Rusinow, "Understanding the Yugoslav Reforms," in *The World Today*, February 1967.

4. There is another current in Serbian nationalism, which might be described as "little Serbianism," potentially as separatist as Croatian forms must always tend to be, but it has never in Yugoslav history formed a significant political force. There are arguments for anticipating that it may do so now, but these lie outside the scope of this Report.

5. The enormous sensitivity of the language issue for Croats (as well as many other European ethnic groups) may puzzle non-Europeans. Its historical roots lie, inter alia, in wide acceptance of nineteenth-century European definitions which made a separate language the most important characteristic of a "nation," without which one's separate national identity could be challenged. It is worth recalling that some nineteenth-century American scholars, including Noah Webster himself, were reflecting the same sensitivity in their efforts to claim and develop a separate identity for the "American language." Like the Croats who feel they must have a recognizably distinct language to avoid the risk of being confounded with or assimilated by the Serbs (or the Serbs who entertain the same feelings in reverse), these Americans really felt that without a distinct American language their separate nationhood and right to separate statehood could be doubted, that they might be considered part of the "English nation." Americans are seldom troubled by this particular self-doubt any more, but English-speaking (or American-speaking?!) Canadians are sometimes not immune. Although written with different alphabets, Serbian and Croatian differ approximately as much as English and American, with the issue further confused by the fact that the spoken language of many Serbs and Montenegrins (who also theoretically speak "Serbian") is closer to the Croatian literary language than to the Serbian one.

6. A more detailed discussion of this aspect of the larger crisis is in Dennison I. Rusinow, *The Price of Pluralism* [DIR-1-'72], Fieldstaff Reports, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 1971.

7. See in particular the 1967-1969 speeches and interviews of Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar, a rereading of which is instructive in the light of later events. (Some have conveniently been collected in book form, e.g., Miko Tripalo, *S poprista* [sic] [Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij, 1971].)

8. See, for example, a Tripalo speech in early 1968 to a meeting of Communists in Rijeka (published in *Vjesnik*, January 25, 1968): "We do not have to conceal the fact that our ranks include a number of comrades who feel that we are facing practically unbridgeable difficulties, that we have

landed in a situation of questioning all the basic socialist ideals for which we used to fight. This is an expression of lack of understanding for the present moment, because it is a question here of an ideological and political regrouping, necessary precisely because of what we have achieved to date, precisely because of the need to be able to consolidate these results by making further progress. In addition, democratization of social and political life since the IV Plenum [the fall of Ranković] has made it possible for all sorts of views and ideas to appear on the surface of our political life. Such views existed before, but they were concealed because of a number of circumstances; today we can see them clearly for what they are and even hostile elements and antisocialist concepts are today more clearly expressed. Is this a good or a bad thing? It is good only insofar as the League of Communists proves capable of winning both ideological and political victory over these alien views and concepts on a public political stage, in a public political struggle.... However, the question arises of whether the LC, as it is today and with its present composition, is capable of such an action. We may be certain that a large number of members are indeed capable of such action. But it is also true that in our ranks we are also dragging along a ballast which has nothing to do with us, which weakens the ability of the LC for political action and which imposes the need to consider in what way we can free ourselves of this ballast and where we shall find the source from which to refresh the LC and make it fit for future tasks." (Later in the speech Tripalo makes clear that he is thinking here of some old Partisans from the war years, "who do not agree that anything is being done right now... [who] are completely demoralized, and there is no reason for them to stay in the LC.") Many other views ascribed by this Report to the Croatian leadership in this period also find a place in this speech, which repeated another then favorite Tripalo thesis that "rosy expectations" aroused by Ranković's fall had not been realized because "various elements," some of them "bureaucratic" in outlook as Ranković, had participated in the coalition that brought him down. It was these other bureaucratic forces who were now blocking progress. "Regardless of the fact that there is probably no one personality around which this bureaucratic-conservative opposition could gather, because [among other things] we are a multi-national country, we should not neglect the fact, Comrades, that in all our Republics, including Croatia, there is an ideo-political platform for these forces, for the forces who feel that self-management leads to the collapse of a socialist society, who feel that one should return to the old administrative-bureaucratic and centralist system." (Cf. almost the same wording in Tripalo to Macedonian Communist leaders in Skopje in November 1967, published by *Vjesnik*, December 1-2, 1967, and a Tripalo article in a Belgrade daily, *Politika*, January 7, 1968.)

9. An edited version of all speeches at the Tenth Session, with Bakarić's December 13 speech as an appendix, was published by *Vjesnik*, as *X Sjednica Centralnog Komiteta Saveza Komunista Hrvatska* (110 pp.), on January 24, 1970.

10. Those taking such a line included Josip Vrhovec, a former *Vjesnik* journalist and only subsequently a member of the Executive Committee, where he played a key role in the opposition to the triumvirate in 1971 and took over as Secretary after Karadjordjevo, and Ante Josipović, later another Executive Committee opponent of Savka and her team. Reading significance into what someone did *not* say on a particular occasion is, however, an obviously risky business. The brief intervention of Jure Bilić, now regarded by many as the postpurge Party "strong-man" in Zagreb, showed no identifiable sign of future dissent. Jakov Blažević, the stolid and earthy relic of older, prewar communism (born 1912, a Party member since 1928) and a Croatian political perennial who is President of the Republican Parliament and who was to attack the triumvirate with particular violence after Karadjordjevo, had similar words for Žanko at the Tenth Session—both times, consistently, in the name of Party discipline and hierarchy.

11. *Op. cit.*, footnote 9. Most of the "subthemes" summarized here appeared or were alluded to in Savka Dabčević-Kučar's characteristically long introductory speech. See also the interventions of Marko Bozić, Bakarić, Tripalo, Pirker, and Srećko Bijelić—all except Bakarić among those purged after Karadjordjevo.

12. One of them told me recently that there were two members of the Party old guard whom he had known intimately since early youth, but would never really know: Bakarić and Koča Popović. Both of them, like my informant, are the Communist sons of wealthy or influential prewar bourgeois families—Popović's father a Belgrade millionaire and Bakarić's a Croatian judge with mildly leftwing proclivities.

13. Their speeches and behavior at the Tenth Session and throughout the following eighteen months display a self-confidence, an optimism, and a certainty that is too convincing for an observer to doubt that they really felt this way.

14. See Slobodan Stanković, "Analysis of the Yugoslav Party Presidium Meeting," RFE Research Communist Area, April 27, 1970.

15. See the Fieldstaff Report cited in footnote 6, above; "The Latest Changes (1971) in the Constitution of the Socialist

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslav Survey*, Vol. XII, No. 4 (November 1971); and R.V. Burks, *The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia* (The Rand Corporation, P-4761, October 1971), pp. 32-38. In some Federal institutions the ethnic key had long been applied in practice. The Amendments provided a constitutional guarantee that this would continue and be extended to other organs.

16. See, e.g., Tripalo's important speech in Dubrovnik on February 26, 1971.