



522 FIFTH AVENUE

NEW YORK 36, N.Y.

MOROCCO'S CRISES COME TO A HEAD

A Letter from Charles F. Gallagher

Tangier
August 30, 1956

August 20 has come to be a fateful day in Morocco since the deposition of Sultan Mohammed V on that date three years ago. The first anniversary of the "date fatidique," as the French called it, saw riots in the principal cities which led to a bloody repression; then August 20, 1955, was the occasion for the massacres of Qued Zem, general disturbances throughout Morocco, and the flaring-up of the Algerian revolution.

This year, the first anniversary of the date to be celebrated since the Sultan's return and the granting of independence, the day was placed under the watchwords of consecration and austerity. Although not officially one of the many new legal holidays, it has been called the "Day of the Revolution of the King and the People" and was the setting for impressive demonstrations of the loyalty and attachment of the people to their sovereign. Before a vast crowd assembled in the prairie-like meshwar of the palace grounds, the Sultan spoke, in the loftily abstract terms he often uses to convey a precise meaning, of the necessity for "the marshalling of the energies of all the men of good will who are in the country." And he added:

"Let us safeguard our independence by our union, our discipline, our brotherhood and our sense of duty."

There was probably a good deal to be read between the lines of the Sultan's statements, since they were made precisely at a period when men of good will were beginning to quarrel openly for the first time and when the country was being shaken by the first crisis of its short political history as an independent state. August 20 was living up to its name as a day of portent. Within a few hours and a few hundred feet of the Sultan, the Special National Congress of the Istiqlal Party was holding its final session. The meeting, timed to draw all possible advantages from the climactic day, was the high point of a feverish week of politics, which included special congresses of the UMT (Union Marocaine de Travail, or Moroccan Labor Union), and of the rival PDI (Parti Democratique de l'Independance, or Democratic Independence Party). When the Istiqlal in its final resolution, passed on the morning of the

20th just before the Sultan spoke, called for unity on its own terms and asked that it be allowed to constitute a "homogeneous government capable of carrying out the emergency program adopted by the Congress," it was clear that the shotgun marriage which had produced the present coalition government was in danger of immediate rupture. And it was further obvious that August 20, 1956, would mark another turning point in modern Morocco's history.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS

The crisis is not a new or a sudden one; it has been latent for most of this year, and the Istiqlal's dissatisfaction with many of the policies of the coalition cabinet and its own role in it has been known for some time. The present government, called one of national union, was set up on December 7, 1955, shortly after the return of the Sultan to Rabat, and had as its principal objective the successful completion of negotiations with France and Spain relating to independence. Cabinet members were chosen by the Sultan in a way that presumably reflected his own desires for tranquillity in the government as well as showing respect for the apparent wishes of the people. The composition of the cabinet ended as 10 Istiqlal members, 6 PDI, and 5 liberal independents (and subsequent additions and changes gave the Istiqlal an extra post). An independent, Si Bekkai, was named Prime Minister. Even in the euphoria of the first days of the Sultan's return much haggling was necessary to convince the Istiqlal that it should accept what it considered a very reduced share of the government, and only the firm request of the Sultan that all participate resolved the question at that time.

On the negotiating level the government was rapidly successful. Independence was granted by France on March 2, after a short two weeks of negotiations, and the unity of the Fortunate Empire was restored when the Spanish government, on April 9, agreed to relinquish its "zone of influence" in northern Morocco. Both these agreements were celebrated with several days-long rejoicings and contributed to the party atmosphere which reigned from November until May. All in all, early this spring life had never been better for Moroccans. Everyone was free, independent, and happy; one could say or do anything he pleased; the foreigners would soon leave; and holidays, bands, kermesses, parades, teas, and free lunches abounded for the delighted man-in-the-street.

Beneath the surface of this quite understandable outburst of enthusiasm, however, the stark realities of economic truth remained. In their eagerness to obtain independence Moroccan negotiators had insisted that priority be given to it and that discussion of interdependence (which meant economic aid) be subordinated to it. These economic negotiations, so vital for the country, are not yet completed.

Meanwhile a diplomatic accord was negotiated, in order to

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allow Moroccan representation abroad, and Morocco was admitted to the UN and many of its specialized agencies. A military agreement was reached with France and Spain which transferred some native units of their armies to Moroccan command and constituted the nucleus of the new Royal Moroccan Army. All of these "victories" involved relatively heavy expenses for a poor country, and while more money was being spent, little was being done to bring in new revenues. Negotiations with the French for economic help dragged on through the summer and it is only in the past few days that it has been reported that France has allowed a provisional credit of Fr. 23,000,000,000 (about \$66,000,000) of the Fr. 35,000,000,000 asked by Morocco for its investment budget.

In the past months the economic situation has been becoming steadily less bright. Numerous strikes and an extraordinary number of holidays (more than 20 days since the beginning of the year) have made for considerable lost time in industry and the worker-output is lower this year than last. Agriculture, which had suffered through 1955 from large-scale terrorist incendiarism, presents another headache after independence: nonpayment of taxes. Many parts of the country, in the Rif and Middle Atlas especially, escaped the control of the central government early this year and in the ensuing anarchy it was impossible to make the farmers pay the tertib. Economic dislocation in the Rif was accentuated by the flight of whole tribes into Spanish Morocco after the rebellion of the Army of Liberation broke out in October 1955. Empty villages were considered ipso facto signs of guilt by the French, who destroyed them and burnt the crops.

Undoubtedly the most important single factor in the slowing down of economic activity has been the insecurity felt by the almost 500,000 Europeans in Morocco. The number of violent incidents is actually much less than before the granting of independence, but this feeling of insecurity is mainly psychological. Many French settlers felt safe only when protected by a French-directed police. Rightly or wrongly, they have doubts about the impartiality of the authorities now that security powers have been turned over to Moroccan hands.

French businessmen, hitherto favored by a friendly government, protective financial arrangements, low taxes, and a cheap, docile labor force which was denied the right to organize or strike, have seen this paradise explode before their eyes within a few months. The UMT has grown since its legalization in the spring of 1955 to a membership of 600,000. With its help wages have risen as much as 50 per cent in the past eight months, from a low that averaged around Fr. 12-15,000 (\$34-43) a month for a laborer. A good number of small enterprises run by Europeans, faced with increased taxes, higher wages, and a constantly rising cost of living, have shut down because they were unable to make ends meet. Others, looking ahead, have concluded that it was useless to struggle against the rising tide. The worries of this class have not been purely economic. Personal safety was at a premium this spring in the Fes-Taza region before the Army of Liberation weeded out elements within it who

were no more than brigands robbing outlying farms and kidnapping or murdering their owners. There was the case of the French director of a small factory near Fes who was giving directions to his Moroccan workers when one of them suddenly took up a pick-axe and crushed in his skull. One would have to know a long history of this director's relations with his employees to comment on the case, but it illustrates the general principle that in Morocco 40 years of foreign rule have left a legacy of hatred that cannot be overcome in a day.

In any event Europeans are now leaving in sizable numbers. Accurate figures are almost impossible to get because for different reasons neither the French nor the Moroccans want to publicize the problem, but one recent estimate, cleverly based on a study of moving and crating firms, concluded that about 2,500 persons a month in excess of normal departures are now leaving Morocco. Since this study included only those with household goods, the real total must be somewhat higher. If this exodus continues at this rate (and nothing at present seems likely to reduce it) it will diminish the European population of the ex-French zone (about 400,000) by one-tenth in a single year. And with these emigrants is going much of the previous prosperity of the country.

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By early July it was clear that the political honeymoon was coming to an end, too. There were increasing signs that all was not as well as pictured and a vague feeling of baffled annoyance and deception was discernible in the people. The Sultan called off a projected pilgrimage to Madagascar, the site of his exile, and to France, and instead went on a visit to the Middle Atlas, Fes, Taza, and the Rif--just those regions where lawlessness had been most prevalent, and where in olden times no ruler of Morocco had ever been accepted by the bellicose Berber tribes. His trip was a great political and personal success, and if he had indeed felt the need to reinforce his prestige he more than accomplished his mission. Everywhere he brought messages of hope, conciliation and good will, and in his capacity as supreme religious leader of the country he was a unifying force able to appease and command respect as no mere political figure could. Later in July he compounded this sound strategical move by sending Crown Prince Mulay Hassan, who receives almost the same degree of veneration as his father, to obtain, in his role as Chief of Staff of the Royal Moroccan Army, the "integration" of the irregular guerrilla forces which held de facto control of the more remote mountain regions. By these two moves the royal family made it clear that it ruled as well as reigned, although it preferred to leave the mechanical means of government to the nominal political leaders of the country.

The latter were meantime beginning to have their own difficulties. The Istiqlal, estimated as the majority party with about 75 per cent of the country supporting it, seems to have been losing ground in the past two or three months. The revolutionary elan which it had engendered was naturally diminishing, and the

party's name alone, "independence," had become a less stirring battle call after the goal was obtained. A certain lassitude with respect to the endless celebrations and parades was evident, and the people began to grumble that their new status had not after all brought them "mutton every Friday" but that, on the contrary, they were paying more for grain, sugar, tea, cigarettes, and gasoline.

Prices, which had been rising steadily, began to spiral up more violently after the imposition of a 4 per cent consumption tax, and on August 1, a series of drastic economic measures were announced, including a rise in the price of gasoline from 36½ francs (about \$.10) a liter to 61 francs (about \$.18), a jump of nearly 30 cents a gallon.* Since most of Morocco's transport is done by trucking the effect of this increase on the price structure is already showing itself. What little goes by rail will be affected as well by the 15 per cent increase in rail freight rates effective August 21.

The Minister of Finance, Benjelloun (PDI) soon found himself in political hot water as a result of these and other measures. With considerable adroitness he finally produced a budget which called for expenditures of Fr. 105,000,000,000 (about \$300,000,000) and receipts of Fr. 92,000,000,000 (about \$263,000,000), an imbalance much smaller than was predicted a few months ago. Some of the deficit of 13 billion francs will be taken care of by the measures mentioned above, but it will still be necessary to assess further taxes and oblige banks to substitute Moroccan Treasury short-term notes for at least some of the French Treasury bills they have been in the habit of holding.

The first signs of a serious policy split within the government showed themselves at the beginning of August. Speaking in Marrakesh, Mehdi ben Barka, one of the leading members of the Executive Committee of the Istiqlal (but not a member of the government) warned that "the Istiqlal cannot approve any longer a policy not of its own making." He pointed out that when the party had agreed to take part in the coalition government of Si Bekkai last year, it had been with the understanding that a precise program of internal and foreign policy would be carried out. Much of this internal program, he emphasized, has not been put into effect because of "obstacles and all sorts of difficulties." These obstacles seem to have been the Finance Minister and the Prime Minister.

The timing of Ben Barka's statement, made on August 1, was perhaps not entirely fortuitous. Two days before, the Sultan had put forward in the Council of Ministers his plan for the creation of a "Consultative Assembly to His Majesty, which will be informed of the acts of the government, will follow its activities

*Other measures included a 20 per cent tax on the profits of companies earning more than Fr. 2,000,000 (about \$5,700) a year and an increase in the income tax from 15 per cent to 18 per cent.

and will be the core of a representative regime. This Assembly will be composed of representatives of all shades of public opinion, of various economic interests, of the political parties and professional groups, as well as of diverse personalities." A glance at the palace statement shows the rather inferior position in which the political parties, here lumped with professional groups, are put, and the idea of having an embryo parliament come into being which represented what the Istiqlal has constantly attacked as "feudal" and "reactionary" elements can hardly have been pleasing to the party. The more so because it was sure it could win a large majority in an election.

The Sultan's statement, however, reflects a consistent pattern of compromise and conciliation which Mohammed V has pursued since his return to the throne. He preferred, he said, to forgive his enemies the past and judge them only on the future work they were willing to do on behalf of Morocco. The people were not so leniently disposed, as was seen in the palace-grounds assassination of several caids who had been in opposition to the Sultan, and in the Marrakesh massacres of supporters of the late Glaoui. It was predictable that a political party like the Istiqlal, relying on mass appeal, would be forced into a certain amount of demagoguery on this subject, particularly when the old standby of attacking the protectorate and the colons no longer had quite the same emotional value it once did.

The dahir (royal decree) instituting the Consultative Assembly of 76 members, all to be chosen by the Sultan, was signed on August 3, and the day before the Secretary of State for Information, Abdallah Ibrahim (Istiqlal) said obliquely that the Assembly would be more of a governmental advisory institution than a true assembly. Was it just imagination that an Istiqlal minister was trying to minimize the role of the Assembly, or had the party decided against it?

A few days later the economic situation took the center of the stage again. The Minister of Agriculture, Nejjai (Istiqlal) took the unusual step of issuing a communique relating his point of view on the gasoline price increases which had been decided in a cabinet meeting on July 30. He was particularly concerned with the repercussions this would have on the farm economy of Morocco, already burdened, he said, with an increase of 30 per cent in farm wages since January and of 20 per cent in the cost of agricultural tools. This was the first official manifestation of the Istiqlal's decision, as announced by Ben Barka, not to be held responsible for the common policy. It was also a grave indication of the state of exasperation in the cabinet divided against itself.

The same day, August 7, the official organ of the Istiqlal, Al Alam, after paying its respects to the Sultan's proposal for the new Assembly, pointed out politely that the present structure of Morocco does not allow really popular elections of the western, democratic type. "If our goal is to install in Morocco a parliamentary regime we should arrive at it only with precautions, reflection,

and without haste," said the daily in a sentence full of meaning.

By August 10 positions had begun to harden on the party front. The PDI, meeting in Casablanca, called for a policy of further austerity, regretted the "difficulties" which its members were encountering in the government, and spoke out vehemently against the arbitrary arrest or kidnapping of its party members by the so-called "special brigades of the National Security Forces." The Istiqlal announced a National Congress for August 19-20 in Rabat, and the Istiqlal-inclined UMT decided to beat the gun by holding its own conference on the 18th. The PDI then seems to have concluded that he who speaks last is heard best, and set August 21 as the date for an extraordinary meeting of its National Council.

A third force was also working, independent of the parties. Prime Minister Bekkai, finishing an inspection trip which doubled as a sounding out of opinion in northern Morocco, spoke on the 10th in somewhat equivocal terms of a possible cabinet resignation. "He who does not succeed, resigns" he said, but went on to defend the government's plan to get money from France, money which, according to the Prime Minister, "will not infringe on our independence." This was a brusque retort to Al Alam, which was complaining at the same moment that 82 per cent of the investment budget (35 billion francs out of 42 billion) was being sought from the "enemy of yesterday."

While preparations for the various congresses went on during the next week, someone evidently stiffened Si Bekkai's back. It is not too difficult to imagine who it was, for the Prime Minister said:

"The desire of our Sultan is that Moroccans remain united. Partisan struggles paralyze the national recovery. I have said and I repeat, that if the interests of the country demand it, I would not hesitate to give my place to others. But I consider that our mission, the mission of the government of national union, is not finished. This is an objective fact, and not merely a desire to remain in power. All the Moroccans who have contributed to the liberation, either through the parties or outside them, should unite more than ever to install a regime of democracy and social justice."

The Prime Minister's statement, which reviewed the activities of his government, was essentially a defense against the expected attacks on the week end. He made an effort to obtain the support, or at least the neutrality of the UMT by paying homage to its leaders Mahjoub ben Seddik and Taieb ben Bouazza. "They know, like me, that the abuse of the strike weapon is dangerous" he said, while going on to criticize the holiday atmosphere in which Morocco had been living. "For nine months we have been going from festival to festival, but work comes before anything else. If there are rights to be won, there are also, and especially, duties to fulfill."

THE CONGRESSES

The UMT meeting opened in Casablanca's large, modern Labor Exchange Hall on the 18th, and from the beginning it was obvious that Si Bekkai's efforts to forestall criticism had been vain. A violent attack on the government, which had "not worked out nor applied a sound economic policy, neglected the social revolution and left Morocco dependent on foreign countries," and on the Finance Minister in particular, left no doubt of the Istiqlal sympathies of Secretary-General Ben Seddik. Detailing the misery of the poorer classes he put the blame on "feudalists and colonialists" who "keep raising their heads."

While giving the government credit for good intentions, Ben Seddik accused it of living beyond its means and of being overburdened with an army of functionaries and policemen. Its improvidence, he said, was making it sell the country's economic independence to France in return for a loan. The principal constructive points of a speech mainly designed for labor consumption were a call for (1) nationalization of certain key industries such as the Sherifian Phosphate Offices, and (2) a switch from indirect taxation toward putting heavy burdens on higher salaries.

The theme enunciated by the UMT was developed during the next two days, August 19 and 20, by the full orchestra of the Istiqlal. Watched by a crowd considerably smaller than that at the previous congress, members of the party gathered in downtown Rabat's Chamber of Commerce to hear Secretary-General (and Foreign Minister) Ahmed Balafrej give himself over to a lengthy indictment of the present government, of colonialism, of secret plots against Moroccan independence, and of the presence of foreign armies on the national soil. Party leader Allal al Fassi, without official position, repeated the charges in more violent form and added a few paragraphs about Moroccan claims on the Saharan regions and Mauretania (a favorite theme of his but one about which Istiqlal leaders who hold cabinet posts are more discreet). In foreign policy he advocated solidarity with the UN, with the Arab League, and with the Bandung States "while not forgetting our Afro-Asiatic position nor our role as a link between East and West."

The resolutions of the Istiqlal Congress, adopted the morning of the second day (August 20) comprised a 7-point plan covering the economic, financial, social, political and administrative fields. They were considerably more moderate in tone than the speeches made on the 19th, and it should be remembered that the Congress discourses were often the same kind of "campaign oratory" found in political gatherings in the United States or elsewhere. A further parallel might be drawn to some extent between the Congress resolutions and the platforms of political parties in America. An observer studying them cannot fail to be impressed by their concern for democracy, social justice, universal education, the rights of man and minorities, etc. They universally condemn the bad and praise the good but they are, everywhere, statements of utopian

intentions which can seldom be carried out to the letter. The Istiqlal Congress resolutions conformed to this pattern, but on-lookers were quick to comment on the internal inconsistencies of a plan which called for (1) austerity but on the other hand increased salaries, family allocations and pensions; (2) mechanization of agriculture and development of hydraulic resources but also the establishment of a budget within the country's means; (3) nationalization of certain industries and a redistribution of land (presumably of the colons) while soliciting the investment of private Moroccan and foreign capital.

The key resolution was that which demanded the application of this 7-point program and added that:

"The National Congress will not permit any members of the Istiqlal Party to take part in any government which is not capable of carrying out this program. The National Congress asks the Executive Committee...to find a way to realize the resignation of our ministers in the present coalition government as soon as possible, and to undertake a démarche to the Sultan in order to constitute a homogeneous government, capable of carrying out the emergency program adopted by the Congress."

Thus, a few hours before the Sultan addressed the people in the meshwar, where little Lalla Amina, born in Madagascar, was crowned "Princess of the Revolution," the crisis was deliberately brought to a head.

Before the Istiqlal Executive Committee had time to carry out its instructions and arrange an audience with the ruler, the PDI held its special congress the following day in Casablanca. It was presided over by the Istiqlal's No. 1 enemy, Finance Minister Benjelloun, acting as interim Secretary-General in the absence of Party Secretary Ouazzani who remained in Switzerland during the crisis.

The Finance Minister's speech, which was the highlight of the gathering, was by any standard a remarkable document in Moroccan politics. In it he presented the unpalatable economic truth to a country which recently had been hearing all foreigners denounced as vicious exploiters who had been sacking the fruits of the land for the past half century.

"Although we have been able to obtain our financial independence from a political point of view, it is quite different on the economic level. If you set up a company and you need capital, you turn to those who have money and, while trying to inspire confidence, you ask them for help and propose guarantees for repayment. It is the same for states which do not have enough capital to develop their national riches. Under the protectorate regime, it was France which brought in the necessary capital to make the factories go, to introduce agricultural equipment from abroad, and to buy the products of our harvests.

"After long years of struggle France has had to abandon the protectorate and Morocco is again independent. But we Moroccans are not rich! And moreover, three years of economic disorder have driven away many foreigners who in better days would have invested their money here. Many Swiss wanted to build in Morocco, because rents here bring in more than in their own country. Americans wanted to open factories here, because workers are not as demanding as they are in the United States. The French wanted to bring in their money, because taxes are less in Morocco than in France. But all these foreigners have left our country and with them has gone the work they would have created."

The Finance Minister put in a claim for royal support by noting that "the PDI has followed the Sultan and his government in a policy of reason and moderation." Going on to defend his conception of the government's financial policies, the Minister pointed out that it was not he who elaborated the budgets of the various ministries, but rather each minister who prepared his own budget after which he, the Finance Minister, grouped them in the state budget. Nothing prevented a minister from submitting economy measures for his own department, he said, but "none of the ministers of the present government has given us the pleasant surprise of a new budgetary conception." And he underlined tellingly that the same Istiqlal ministers who now wanted his scalp had not only submitted their own budgets but had studied and concurred in all the other budgets which the Sultan had promulgated in a dahir at the beginning of August.

"This is why I stress" he added, "that we cannot have two policies, one for internal consumption and one for external usage. We do not preach xenophobia to some and friendship to others. We say that we must come together. The people of the earth are like the fingers on a hand; all are linked with each other."

And his conclusion was no less bitter in regard to the Istiqlal's bid for power.

"Today I observe the existence of an artificial excitement which has been provoked through completely demagogic means by those who hope to prevail by exploiting it. Tomorrow it is the whole Moroccan people who will judge this attitude."

As would be expected after this forthright statement, the PDI Congress refused to allow the party to leave the government and, addressing telegrams to this effect to the Sultan, threw the gauntlet down to its rival party while making the sovereign the supreme arbiter of the crisis.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE MEANING OF THE CRISIS

The week following the hectic week end of the 19th and 20th seemed like the lull after the storm. The Executive Committee

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of the Istiqlal was received by the Sultan on the 24th, but the request to be allowed to resign en masse did not receive an immediate answer. It was put off, significantly, until a second audience at an unspecified date in the future. The day before the Sultan, receiving a group of newly-formed administrators, had limited himself to the laconic statement that "an austerity regime must be installed in Morocco." But he gave no hint as to whose aegis it would be installed under.

In subsequent days support came to both parties from all parts of the country. The numerically insignificant Moroccan Communist Party offered to make common cause with the Istiqlal, an offer which has gone unanswered and which is sure to be left untouched by a party which already has a majority. The small PUI (Party of Unity and Independence) of Tangier and Northern Morocco, obviously favoring the continued existence of minority parties gave its support to the PDI. More notable was the solidarity of a circle of Berber tribal leaders who heard the Caid El Youssi, speaking at Immouzer n Kandar denounce the Istiqlal attempt at "dictatorship."

Up to this writing there has been no definitive solution to the crisis. The lull, in fact, has been more significant than the violent oratory which preceded it, for, if much of the speech-making could be dismissed as party talk, and if the Istiqlal program seemed vague and ill-defined, the ensuing silence has indicated that representatives of other forces, who may be the real masters of the situation, have yet to be heard from. Just who they are and what they want is a delicate problem still shrouded in the mysteries which have made Moroccan politics in the past year look more like a detective thriller than a struggle of governmental policy.

The first weeks of independence brought out of hiding many forces already known and several elements which were not. For months this spring the Army of Liberation, which was the only government in all the Rif, most of the North, and the Middle Atlas, remained in the background. All the political parties claimed this "shadow army" as their own. When a local PDI leader from Fes, Laraki, stole a march on his rivals and announced the names of some of the leaders of the Army of Liberation, he was promptly assassinated. A certain warning, but given by whom?

When the Army of Liberation chose finally to make an appearance, it arranged that it should be apart from the patronage of any party. Thirty grizzled, early middle-aged guerrillas simply presented themselves at the Imperial Palace one morning and were later shown to the press. In the same way eight of their men made an entrance into Tangier, sat down at a large central cafe and ordered coffee. Conversation fell to a whisper as everyone stared at the "mystery men" who departed as silently as they had come.

During the long period this spring of clashes between this army and the French forces, the Palace maintained contact with it and was usually able to arrange the release of kidnapped soldiers and pacify the spirits of both parties. With the setting-up of the

Royal Army in May, some elements of the Army of Liberation were inducted into it; others were sent home and they and many of their leaders have just disappeared. Some are still carrying out police operations in remote areas, where they seem to be respected by the people as a source of law and order in default of any other. In Casablanca rival factions of ex-terrorist groups (who probably did not belong to the Army of Liberation) have been shooting it out on several occasions in a squaring of accounts. No one knows, or will say, just how strong these groups are, but as they descend progressively from "resistance" to "banditry" their political future is becoming more obscure. As for the Army of Liberation, its role is probably increasing, and although it has not yet made itself manifest in the present crisis, no one thinks it has really disappeared from the scene or that it will not eventually have its word to say.

When the Sultan, in his August 20 speech, mentioned the names of dead heroes of the resistance, he added to them without further comment the names of a few victims of "partisan struggles." Without doubt another warning, but to whom? And although no one dares openly make the least direct criticism of the Sultan, the mere fact that Al Alām has denounced some of the officials he named personally and has kept in office is a sign that he is not always considered infallible by everyone.

So although the crisis that opened on August 20 is far from settled, it is likely that its denouement is the real objective of all concerned. An outsider receives a strong impression that beneath the surface strong revolutionary movements are at work, although it is too early to say how strong they are and in which direction they are headed. Perhaps the most certain result of the crisis is the gradual accumulation in Moroccan politics of groups which are tending for the first time to the right or left as we know them. The Moroccan revolution was classless and all elements of the nation participated in it. Now that, as even the Istiqlal Congress admitted, most of the foreign policy goals have been attained, and economic problems are coming to the fore, the first sign of a split along these lines can be detected. With the support of the UMT it is probable that the Istiqlal will drift into a position fairly left of center, and in order to counterbalance its numerical strength the other smaller parties, focusing around the PDI, will likely coalesce in a more conservative stand. The economic difficulties which seem inevitable will work to draw these elements to more extreme positions from time to time, while the Sultan, who has hitherto maintained the balance, will certainly find his conciliatory work more difficult than before. Then there remains the question of the other forces. If the left and right, as some predict, come to blows--there were several serious riots between PDI and Istiqlal supporters this spring--what role will the Army play in the maintenance of order? And which army? The Royal Army, now replete with several thousand recently inducted Army of Liberation irregulars, or the remnants of that force who have folded their tents and slipped away? And were the French perhaps right after all when they predicted an open breach between the Berber mountain tribes and the urban proletariat after French control had terminated? All these are among the many unanswered questions in a tense, uncertain Morocco at the end of August 1956.

CF Gallacher